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INTRODUCTION 
Crowdfunding, the raising of large quantities of small funds through the 
internet crowd,1 has been gaining momentum worldwide.2 The issue for 
securities crowdfunding in the United States is whether the Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 20123 will be able to balance low cost of 
compliance for small businesses and entrepreneurs against the need for 
investor protection in such a way as to allow ordinary, non-accredited investors 
(also known as retail investors) to provide small businesses and entrepreneurs 
the access to capital for which they are starving. Title III of the JOBS Act—
referred to as the CROWDFUND Act—contains the crowdfunding exemption 
to registration of securities that would allow the non-accredited crowd to 
invest.4 
President Obama hailed crowdfunding as a “game changer” that would 
allow “ordinary Americans to go online and invest in entrepreneurs they 
believe in.”5 Former SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro sees the JOBS Act and 
crowdfunding as ushering in a new era, and she describes this legislation as a 
“fundamental change in the securities markets.”6 Crowdfunding has 
revolutionary potential, and, if implemented correctly, it could “be a boon to 
small businesses and growing businesses that sometimes are shut out of those 
 
 1. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 10 (2012). This is distinguishable from perhaps the more traditional form of 
raising funds through a bank, an angel investor, or through a public offering of securities. Id. at 
101–03. This is not to say the concept of crowdfunding is new; it has “been the backbone of the 
American political system since politicians started kissing babies.” Id. at 11 & n.17 (quoting JEFF 
HOWE, CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE FUTURE OF 
BUSINESS 253 (2008)). This Comment uses the term “crowdfunding” in its most contemporary 
sense, namely, seeking small funds through the internet crowd. Crowdfunding is the product of 
crowdsourcing and microfinance. Id. at 27. Crowdsourcing usually consists of “breaking a project 
into tiny component tasks and farming those tasks out to the general public by posting the 
requests on a website.” Rachel Emma Silverman, Big Firms Try Crowdsourcing, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 17, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702044090045771574932018632 
00.html. Microfinance is the offering of small-ticket loans to help start or expand businesses. 
Ashutosh Joshi, SKS Microfinance Shares Jump on Loan Deal, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324640104578164602767925688.html; see also 
Joseph Adinolfi, Mini Loans Feed Bigger Ambitions, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8–9, 2012, at B1. 
 2. Yen, State of International Crowdfunding, LAUNCHT (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.launcht. 
com/blog/2013/02/06/state-of-international-crowdfunding/. 
 3. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012) 
[hereinafter JOBS Act]. 
 4. Id. “CROWDFUND” stands for: Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and 
Unethical Non-Disclosure. Id. § 301. 
 5. Jean Eaglesham, Crowdfunding Efforts Draw Suspicion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2013, at 
C1. 
 6. Angus Loten, Stalled Crowdfunding Rules Leave Business Plans on Ice, WALL ST. J., 
Dec.13, 2012, at B1. 
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very fancy boardrooms where decisions are made behind closed doors and in 
very secretive meetings.”7 
The CROWDFUND Act requires that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) promulgate regulations to flesh out many of the details of 
the Act’s statutory framework, and on October 23, 2013, the SEC unanimously 
approved its proposed rules.8 Though securities crowdfunding under the 
CROWDFUND Act requires the SEC to adopt final rules in order to be 
operational, this Comment focuses on the SEC’s proposed rules because the 
policies and challenges identified in the proposed rules will persist regardless 
of the content of the final rules. More specifically, this Comment focuses on 
what an ambitious securities crowdfunding intermediary should extract from 
the proposed rules; by analyzing the proposed rules, a proactive intermediary 
can arm itself with a decisive competitive advantage over other intermediaries. 
Ultimately, an intermediary that can distinguish itself from the pack will win 
over more investors and issuers than its competitors. 
The CROWDFUND Act requires that securities be crowdfunded via an 
intermediary,9 which is an online platform. The SEC proposed to define an 
intermediary as “a broker registered under Section 15(b) of the Exchange Act 
(15 U.S.C. 78o(b)) or a funding portal registered under § 227.400 and includes, 
where relevant, an associated person of the registered broker or registered 
 
 7. 158 CONG. REC. S1778 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2012) (statement of Sen. Mary Landrieu). 
 8. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 200, 227, 232, 239–40, 249). The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a non-
governmental self-regulatory organization of the securities industry, is also expected to issue 
certain limited rules, but these are not the focus of this Comment. Regulatory Notice 12-34: 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act: FINRA Requests Comment on Proposed Regulation of 
Crowdfunding Activities, FINRA 2 (July 2012), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/in 
dustry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p131268.pdf (“The regulatory scheme established 
by Congress expressly contemplates a role for an organization such as FINRA by mandating that 
each registered funding portal be a member of an applicable SRO. However, Congress limited a 
national securities association’s examination and enforcement authority over such registered 
funding portals to its rules ‘written specifically for registered funding portals.’”) (footnote 
omitted). It should be noted that, though the SEC unanimously approved its proposed rules, 
broader approval of the proposed rules has been far from unanimous. For example, recently the 
Investor Advisory Committee, whose opinion the SEC values, unanimously voted to recommend 
stricter crowdfunding rules because it did not believe that the SEC had reached the appropriate 
balance in the proposed rules. Ted Knutson, SEC Advisory Committee Wants Tighter Crowd-
Funding Rules, FINANCIAL ADVISOR (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.fa-mag.com/news/sec-
advisory-committee-wants-tighter-crowd-funding-rules-17580.html; Inv. Advisory Comm., 
Recommendation of the Investor Advisory Committee: Crowdfunding Regulations, SEC (Apr. 10, 
2014), available at www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/investment-advis 
er-crowdfunding-recommendation.pdf. 
 9. “Securities Act Section 4(a)(6)(C) requires a [securities] crowdfunding transaction to be 
conducted through a broker or funding portal that complies with the requirements of Securities 
Act Section 4A(a).” Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,458. 
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funding portal.”10 A funding portal is a new creation of the CROWDFUND 
Act, and it is encumbered with significantly more restrictions than a broker-
dealer.11 In discussing what an ambitious intermediary should extract from the 
SEC’s proposed rules, this Comment discusses many things that only a broker-
dealer intermediary could do. A funding portal intermediary will still benefit 
from this discussion, especially because funding portals are already partnering 
with broker-dealer intermediaries.12 Accordingly, this Comment contemplates 
the ideal securities crowdfunding intermediary, which has all the legal 
flexibility of a broker-dealer and all the technological savvy of a funding 
portal, and so the distinction between broker-dealer and funding portal is 
disregarded for purposes of this Comment. 
Throughout the proposed rules, the SEC touted the flexibility that it was 
allowing intermediaries. Intermediaries need to recognize the opportunity that 
this flexibility presents. This flexibility respects intermediaries’ expertise, and 
it is an opportunity for intermediaries to develop an efficient and tailored 
 
 10. Id. at 66,556 (§ 227.300(c)(3)). 
 11. See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 304(b), 126 Stat. 306, 322 (2012); see also Joan 
MacLeod Heminway, The New Intermediary on the Block: Funding Portals under the 
CROWDFUND Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 177, 205 (2013) (“The combined attributes 
assigned to funding portals in the CROWDFUND Act, when viewed in their actual and 
anticipated regulatory context, may very well be so burdensome and costly that they discourage 
the development and registration of funding portals.”). 
 12. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,516 (“[O]ur conversations with industry participants 
indicate that market competition to offer broker-dealer services as part of intermediaries’ service 
capabilities might either drive more broker-dealer growth in the longer term or provide registered 
funding portals with the incentive to form long-term partnerships with registered broker-dealers. 
For example, crowdfunding platforms could have incentives to partner with broker-dealers 
because of broker-dealers’ experience in providing recommendations or investment advice, as 
well as broker-dealers’ access to investors. There is anecdotal evidence that these partnerships are 
already forming under existing regulations, and one report predicted that in the first quarter of 
2013, two to three dozen crowdfunding portals would partner with broker-dealers to start 
conducting private offerings under Regulation D in anticipation of securities-based 
crowdfunding.”) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 66,526 (“[W]e believe that some brokers 
might acquire or form partnerships with funding portals to obtain access to a new and diverse 
investor base.”); see also Andrew D. Stephenson, Brian R. Knight & Matthew Bahleda, From 
Revolutionary to Palace Guard: The Role and Requirements of Intermediaries Under Proposed 
Regulation Crowdfunding, 3 MICH. J. PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. (forthcoming 2014) 
(“[I]t is questionable whether for-profit businesses will enter the market as pure funding portals, 
instead preferring to become or partner with a broker-dealer, leaving the funding portal entity 
viable for only non-profits and other entities less concerned with financial return.”); Letter from 
Kim Wales, Exec. Bd. Member, Steve Ferrando, Bd. Member, & Chris Tyrell, Chairman, 
Crowdfund Intermediary Regulatory Advocates, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Securities 
& Exchange Commission (Jan. 26, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s 
70913-261.pdf (“Before the Final Title III Rules are adopted and crowdfunding is implemented, it 
is readily apparent that Funding Portals and Broker Dealers will be coordinating efforts to the 
extent permissible by law.”). 
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method to carry out securities crowdfunding under the CROWDFUND Act.13 
This flexibility is the space where great intermediaries will stand out from 
decent intermediaries and therefore attract more investors and issuers. In 
addition to sleek and user-friendly platforms, intermediaries will attract these 
groups by streamlining the compliance process under the CROWDFUND Act 
for investors and issuers. 
If intermediaries simply treat this flexibility as a null obligation, they 
should not be surprised to have issuers or investors drag them into lawsuits 
over either issuers’ or investors’ own compliance failures. Additionally, 
intermediaries could potentially see this flexibility regulated away in response 
to such lawsuits. Ambitious intermediaries will not view the grants of 
“flexibility” from the SEC as null obligations, but rather as challenges to show 
how they can devise more effective systems than the SEC could have hoped to 
create by regulation.14 
While this Comment discusses items that an ambitious intermediary ought 
to extract from the SEC’s proposed rules, lackadaisical intermediaries should 
be wary of dismissing this Comment as inapplicable. For example, as the SEC 
discusses intermediaries sourcing certain obligations out to third parties, the 
SEC is clear that the intermediaries “remain responsible for compliance with 
the requirements.”15 An intermediary cannot simply outsource to a third party 
and close its eyes—it “should investigate and understand the procedures used 
 
 13. An intermediary would be mistakenly narrow-minded to believe that theirs is simply a 
passive platform role. See ROCKETHUB, IMPLEMENTATION OF CROWDFUNDING: BUILDING ON 
TITLE III OF THE JOBS ACT: RESPONSE TO PROPOSED RULES (RELEASE NO. 33-9470) 12 (Feb. 
2014) [hereinafter ROCKETHUB WHITEPAPER 3.0], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/ 
s7-09-13/s70913-206.pdf (“An intermediary may initially seem to serve solely as the platform on 
which an issuer’s offering appears. In actuality, the intermediary creates the user experience and 
the user interface for both issuers and investors. The intermediary also creates the system through 
which issuers and investors interact with one another and third-party service providers. For 
example, whether or not a Portal uses a third-party payment service or its own technology, the 
issuer will perceive them as one and the same.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Letter from Nicholas Tommarello, Chief Exec. Officer, Wefunder, to the U.S. 
Securities & Exchange Commission (Jan. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Wefunder Letter 2], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913-179.pdf (“Product designers whose profession 
and expertise is information design can come up with superior solutions that will achieve better 
results than what is currently envisioned in the proposed rules.”). Professor Stuart Cohn expresses 
a similar sentiment when speaking about legislators intending to legislate an ideal crowdfunding 
framework. Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad 
Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1445 (2012) (“Yet, for all their good intentions, legislators are 
not experts in the nuances of securities laws and existing federal and state laws. The results 
reflected this lack of expertise, with House bills containing too few protective measures, the 
Senate bills containing too many.”). 
 15. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,464. 
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by the third party to determine the reasonableness of the reliance on a third 
party.”16 
There will be competition between intermediary platforms,17 and there will 
be some that are driven from the market.18 This is fine, so long as there are 
trustworthy and robust intermediaries that protect investors,19 help 
entrepreneurs with compliance,20 and ultimately get those entrepreneurs access 
to capital through securities crowdfunding.21 In fact, ambitious intermediaries 
 
 16. Id. at 66,464 n.373. 
 17. The SEC anticipates this competition: “Moreover, the business models of the successful 
crowdfunding intermediaries are likely to change over time as they grow in size or market share 
or if they are forced to differentiate from other market participants in order to maintain a place in 
the market.” Id. at 66,527. 
 18. See, e.g., Mark Fidelman, 13 Experts and 13 Trends That Will Dominate Crowdfunding 
in 2014, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 29, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-fidelman/13-ex 
perts-crowdfunding_b_4677749.html (quoting Steve O’Hear, Technology journalist for 
TechCrunch) (“I think there are too many platforms and we are likely to see some go away and/or 
consolidation, although it’s still early days. Any platform has to attract both investors looking to 
invest and companies looking to raise. The more you have of one, the more you can attract the 
other. Additionally, the larger the network the more useful the network becomes. A classic 
network-effects play. In the long term it makes sense therefore that only a finite number of 
platforms can be supported by the market.”); see also Wefunder Letter 2, supra note 14 
(anticipating a dominant crowdfunding platform after a couple of years). 
 19. The importance of investor protection is what slowed down the JOBS Act in the Senate. 
See 158 CONG. REC. S1777 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2012) (statement of Sen. Mary Landrieu). The 
House had passed their version H.R. 3606 in huge bipartisan numbers (390 to 23); however, 
numerous senators brought the issue of inadequate investor protections to the Senate floor. See 
158 CONG. REC. S1963–77 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin) 
(entering into the record the statement of Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Comm’r, Investor Protection Is 
Needed for True Capital Formation); 158 CONG. REC. S1700 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2012) 
(statement of Sen. Richard Durbin) (making clear that he wants to “engender economic growth 
but not at the expense of the integrity of America’s financial markets or at the expense of the 
innocent investors”). 
 20. See, e.g., Crowd Funding—Lessons Learned in 8 Years of Equity Crowd Funding, 
IPLEDGE (Jan. 28, 2014), http://ipledg.com/blog/?p=513. After discussing the Australian Small 
Scale Offerings Board (ASSOB), which has had eight years of experience in equity crowdfunding 
outside the United States, the article reflectively notes: “Perhaps the biggest matters uncovered 
include not initially having oversight of the issuers share registry, originally thinking it could be 
all done online, and expecting issuers could manage large parts of the process themselves.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 21. Catering to entrepreneurs was an essential part of the intent of Congress in passing the 
JOBS Act. See, e.g., 158 CONG. REC. S1705 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2012) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) 
(“The JOBS Act will demonstrate to entrepreneurs and job creators that we value what they do, 
that we want to make it easier for them to innovate, to gain access to capital to grow and to lift 
others up as they become more successful.”). 
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should seek to shoulder the weight of compliance because the system works 
best when they bear the highest compliance cost.22 
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief background of 
crowdfunding and the passage of the CROWDFUND Act. Part II provides a 
condensed overview of the CROWDFUND Act. Part III discusses the statutory 
requirements on intermediaries. Lastly, Part IV discusses the SEC’s proposed 
rules for intermediaries under the CROWDFUND Act, especially in light of 
the thesis introduced above. 
I.  BACKGROUND OF CROWDFUNDING AND THE CROWDFUND ACT 
While there are several different types of crowdfunding,23 this Comment is 
concerned with securities crowdfunding. Securities crowdfunding encompasses 
either equity or debt crowdfunding and, unlike non-securities crowdfunding, is 
not inherently limited as non-securities crowdfunding.24 In fact, Danae 
Ringelmann, co-founder of the successful crowdfunding website Indiegogo, 
 
 22. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Keep it Light, Chairman White: SEC Rulemaking Under the 
CROWDFUND Act, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 43, 60 (2013) (“[T]he SEC should use a light 
touch in drafting rules for securities crowdfunding—but . . . . place a relatively heavy burden on 
intermediaries” so as to enforce the annual cap, which is “so important to the entire statutory 
scheme.”); see also While US Equity Crowdfunding Waits, UK Equity Crowdfunding Spikes, 
CROWDFORCE (Nov. 1, 2012), https://crowdforce.co/while-us-equity-crowdfunding-waits-uk-
equity-crowdfunding-spikes. The success of equity crowdfunding in the United Kingdom, which 
is already legal, is due in large part to the relatively high cost of compliance placed on 
crowdfunding intermediaries. Id. The U.K. securities system is much like the U.S. securities 
system in that both are built around investor protection by requiring detailed disclosures. Id. In 
equity crowdfunding in the U.K., the responsibility for disclosure falls to the crowdfunding 
intermediaries. Id. In other words, “as long as Crowdcube or Seedrs or GrowVc or any of the 
other U.K. crowdfunding platforms are willing to vouch for their projects, then those projects can 
be legally crowdfunded through equity giveaways.” Id. For a more comprehensive discussion of 
equity crowdfunding abroad in the U.K., Italy, France, and elsewhere worldwide, see Ross S. 
Weinstein, Crowdfunding in the U.S. and Abroad: What to Expect When You’re Expecting, 46 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 427, 437–49 (2013). But see 158 CONG. REC. S2231 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 
2012) (statement of Sen. Scott Brown) (“[A]ll rules, regulations and registration requirements 
should be developed with minimal burden and cost to the intermediaries . . . [because] these costs 
will ultimately be passed through to issuers.”). The Senator has a point, but this Comment argues 
that the intermediaries that succeed will be the ones who can best internalize compliance costs 
and present a streamlined, low-compliance-cost process to entrepreneurs. 
 23. Professor Steven Bradford specifies five different categories based on what investors are 
promised for their contributions: (1) the donation model, (2) the reward model, (3) the pre-
purchase model, (4) the lending model, and (5) the equity model. Bradford, supra note 1, at 14–
15. Professor Bradford’s analysis concludes that donation, reward, and pre-purchase models do 
not involve securities, but lending with a promise of interest and equity model crowdfunding are 
likely securities for the purposes of the Securities Act of 1933. Id. at 31. 
 24. C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise Unfulfilled, 40 
SEC. REG. L.J. 195, 197 (2012) (noting that non-securities crowdfunding “can only attract a 
limited number of investors.”). 
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said that equity crowdfunding was the original idea.25 Only after realizing 
securities regulation barred the equity approach did Indiegogo offer “perks” to 
funders of different campaigns.26 
Issuing securities triggers the need to comply with both federal and state 
securities laws.27 To comply with federal law, securities offerings must be 
registered with the SEC under section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, although 
there are certain exemptions.28 Prior to the CROWDFUND Act there was no 
federal exemption that catered well to securities crowdfunding.29 State 
securities laws, or “Blue Sky” laws, would also apply to crowdfunding 
securities,30 but the CROWDFUND Act treats crowdfunding securities as 
“covered securities,” making state securities laws largely preempted and 
irrelevant.31 Therefore, this analysis will only focus on the issues pertaining to 
federal securities laws. 
Given the inadequate structure of section 5 of the 1933 Act and the strong 
push behind crowdfunding in Congress, President Obama signed the JOBS Act 
into law on April 5, 2012, and thereby created an exemption for securities 
crowdfunding under Title III of the Act, namely the CROWDFUND Act.32 
 
 25. Stephen Shankland, Indiegogo Moves Crowdfunding Business Beyond USA, CNET 
(Dec. 5, 2012, 8:03 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-11386_3-57557268-76/indiegogo-moves-
crowdfunding-business-beyond-usa/. More recently, Indiegogo’s other co-founder, Slava Rubin, 
has intimated that, after the SEC finalizes crowdfunding rules, Indiegogo “will look to 
experiment and . . . evolve as needed.” Alex Konrad, Crowdfunder Indiegogo Raises Its Own Big-
Time Funding, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexkonrad/2014/ 
01/28/indiegogo-raises-big-time-funding/. 
 26. Shankland, supra note 25. 
 27. See Bradford, supra note 1, at 30. 
 28. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2012). 
 29. See Nikki D. Pope, Crowdfunding Microstartups: It’s Time for the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to Approve a Small Offering Exemption, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 973 (2011); 
see also Joan MacLeod Heminway, What Is a Security in the Crowdfunding Era?, 7 OHIO ST. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 335, 370 (2012) (concluding that the U.S. system of financial 
regulation has become outdated to deal with the complexity and fluidity of financial interests, 
which can be seen by, among other things, focusing on what is classified as securities in the 
crowdfunding era). 
 30. D. Scott Freed, Crowdfunding as a Platform for Raising Small Business Capital, MD. 
B.J., July–Aug. 2012, at 12, 14. 
 31. STUART R. COHN, Part III. Planning for Exemption from Federal Regulation—Chapter 
9A. Section 4(6)—The Crowdfunding Exemption, in 1 SECURITIES COUNSELING FOR SMALL & 
EMERGING COMPANIES § 9A:8 (2012). Section 4(a)(6) was made a part of the list of covered 
securities in section 18(a)(4) of the 1933 Securities Act. Id. at n.1 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(4)). 
State antifraud requirements are still applicable as are state filing fees in the state of the issuer’s 
principal place of business and any state in which the purchasers represent 50% or more of the 
total purchases. Id. 
 32. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 301, 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012). 
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II.  TITLE III OF THE JOBS ACT OF 2012: THE CROWDFUND ACT 
The CROWDFUND Act is laid out in a new section of the Securities Act 
of 1933, section 4(a)(6).33 As long as a given investor does not exceed an 
individual investment cap based on the investor’s net worth and annual 
income, section 4(a)(6) exempts an issuer’s offering of one million dollars or 
less.34 The CROWDFUND Act requires that securities be offered through an 
intermediary that complies with the new section 4A(a) of the Securities Act; 
the issuer will have to comply with the new section 4A(b).35 The issuer 
requirements are largely disclosure related,36 and the intermediary 
requirements will be discussed below. 
III.  WHAT THE CROWDFUND ACT REQUIRES OF INTERMEDIARIES 
Section 4A(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 is amended by section 302(b) 
of the CROWDFUND Act, which prescribes the requirements for 
intermediaries.37 A crowdfunding intermediary for purposes of the new section 
4(a)(6) must be either a broker or a funding portal.38 Such intermediaries must 
register with any applicable self-regulatory organization (SRO), as defined in 
section 3(a)(26) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.39 The intermediaries 
are required to provide disclosures related to risks and other investor education 
materials that the SEC determines are necessary.40 The intermediary must 
ensure that each investor reviews the investor education materials, affirms their 
understanding of the same, acknowledges the possibility they might lose their 
entire investment, and answers questions showing an understanding of startup 
investment risk generally and the risk of illiquidity.41 
Furthermore, intermediaries must guard against fraud by doing, inter alia, 
background checks on an issuer’s officers.42 The intermediary must leave a 
funding period open for a minimum of twenty-one days, and it cannot allow 
proceeds to reach an issuer unless the target has been met or surpassed.43 The 
intermediary is also tasked to ensure that no investor exceeds investment limits 
 
 33. Id. § 302(a), 126 Stat. at 315 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. § 302(a)–(b), 126 Stat. at 316–17 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-1(a)–(b)). 
 36. See id. § 302(b), 126 Stat. at 317–18 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1)). 
 37. JOBS Act, § 302(b), 126 Stat. at 315 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)). 
 38. Id. § 302(b), 126 Stat. at 316 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-1(a)(1)). As mentioned 
above, this Comment is not concerned with the distinction between a broker and a funding portal 
intermediary, but rather it focuses on crowdfunding intermediaries generally. See supra 
INTRODUCTION. 
 39. JOBS Act, § 302(b), 126 Stat. at 316 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(2)). 
 40. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(3)). 
 41. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(4)). 
 42. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(5)). 
 43. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-1(a)(6)–(7)). 
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in a twelve-month period and to take precautions to protect the privacy of an 
investor’s information.44 Also, the intermediary cannot compensate promoters 
who provide them with potential investor information.45 Nor can directors, 
officers, or partners of an intermediary have a financial interest in an issuer 
using its services.46 Lastly, there is a catch-all phrase allowing the SEC to 
promulgate whatever other guidance is necessary “for the protection of 
investors and in the public interest.”47 Through this catch-all phrase and other 
language throughout these intermediary requirements, Congress mandated that 
the SEC promulgate regulations to flesh out the statutory framework. These 
regulations are the basis for the SEC’s proposed rules discussed below. 
IV.  THE SEC’S PROPOSED RULES FOR INTERMEDIARIES UNDER THE 
CROWDFUND ACT 
This Part discusses what an ambitious securities crowdfunding 
intermediary should extract from the SEC’s proposed rules. Regardless of the 
content of the final rules, the policies and challenges identified in the proposed 
rules will persist. By analyzing the SEC’s discussion in the proposed rules, 
specifically where the SEC proposes minimal additions to the statutory 
framework and provides intermediaries with significant flexibility, an 
intermediary can discover how best to address the underlying challenges of 
securities crowdfunding under the CROWDFUND Act. Identifying and 
addressing these challenges is where great intermediaries will distinguish 
themselves from the rest, and it is that distinction that will attract investors and 
issuers to great intermediaries. 
This Part proceeds in seven sections. Section A looks at an intermediary’s 
liability under the proposed rules. Section B analyzes an intermediary’s 
obligations to reduce fraud. Section C discusses an intermediary’s 
responsibility with respect to opening investor accounts, while Section D 
addresses requirements with respect to securities crowdfunding transactions. 
Section E looks at challenges relating to material changes in an offering’s 
terms, and Section F addresses certain payments to third parties. Lastly, 
Section G looks at how to make liquidity as accessible as possible for 
crowdfunding investors. This Part does not exhaustively review all the 
proposed requirements for intermediaries; rather it focuses on requirements 
where the SEC proposed minimal changes to the statutory framework because 
such requirements provide the flexibility for exceptional intermediaries to 
stand out from the crowd. 
 
 44. JOBS Act, § 302(b), 126 Stat. at 316 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-1(a)(8)–(9)). 
 45. Id. § 302(b), 126 Stat. at 317 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(10)). 
 46. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(11)). 
 47. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(12)). 
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A. A Brief Look at Intermediary Liability to Frame the Discussion 
As mentioned above, treating “flexibility” as a null obligation is a liability 
for intermediaries. Section 4A(c) proposes to make an issuer liable to someone 
who purchases its securities under the CROWDFUND Act, if the issuer: 
[M]akes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact 
required to be stated or necessary in order to make the statements . . . not 
misleading, provided that the purchaser did not know of the untruth or 
omission, and the issuer does not sustain the burden of proof that such issuer 
did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of 
the untruth or omission.48 
Because “Section 4A(c)(3) defines, for purposes of the liability provisions of 
Section 4A, an issuer as including ‘any person who offers or sells the security 
in such offering,’”49 the SEC thinks it is “likely that intermediaries . . . would 
be considered issuers for purposes of this liability provision.”50 Accordingly, 
the SEC is clear that intermediaries need to have policies in place to ensure 
issuer compliance.51 
Now, intermediaries might downplay this potential liability because the 
SEC also proposed “a safe harbor for certain insignificant deviations from a 
term, condition or requirement of Regulation Crowdfunding.”52 The SEC 
proposes, however, a safe harbor for issuers “because, under the statute, an 
issuer could lose the exemption because of the failure of the intermediary to 
comply with the requirements of Section 4A(a),” and the SEC “believe[s] that 
an issuer should not lose the offering exemption due to such failure by the 
intermediary, which likely would be out of the issuer’s control, if the issuer did 
not know of such failure . . . .”53 Issuers who find themselves sued for 
wrongful offerings will lean very hard on this language of the SEC so that they 
do not forfeit the exemption.54 Such issuers will say that it was the 
intermediary’s compliance failure entirely and that as a simple issuer they had 
 
 48. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,498–99 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013). 
 49. Id. at 66,499. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. (“We believe that steps intermediaries could take in exercising reasonable care in 
light of this liability provision would include establishing policies and procedures that are 
reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the requirements of Regulation Crowdfunding, 
and that include the intermediary conducting a review of the issuer’s offering documents, before 
posting them to the platform, to evaluate whether they contain materially false or misleading 
information.”) (footnote omitted). 
 52. Id. at 66,496 (referencing proposed Rule 502 of Regulation Crowdfunding (§ 227.502)). 
 53. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,496. 
 54. It should be noted that the safe harbor is not an automatic pass: “[T]he proposed rules 
would provide that notwithstanding this safe harbor, any failure to comply with Regulation 
Crowdfunding would nonetheless be actionable by the Commission.” Id. (referencing proposed 
Rule 502(b) of Regulation Crowdfunding (§ 227.502(b))). 
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no idea. In precisely such a situation as this, an intermediary will be glad that it 
did not treat the flexibility in the proposed rules as a null obligation; an 
intermediary will be able to point to the best practices it took so as to surpass 
the minimum statutory and regulatory requirements. 
Additionally, intermediaries might downplay the potential liability because 
the SEC also included “an exception from disqualification for offerings in 
which the issuer establishes that it did not know and, in the exercise of 
reasonable care, could not have known that a disqualification existed because 
of the presence or participation of another covered person.”55 Again, when an 
issuer is sued for wrongful action, the issuer will claim it took reasonable care. 
Arguably, “reasonable care” for an unsophisticated issuer will be a lower 
standard relative to intermediary standards. And again, an issuer will lay blame 
on its intermediary, claiming, for example, that the intermediary did not advise 
them otherwise. 
This disqualification example also illustrates the balancing act for 
intermediaries. Exercising reasonable care that no disqualifications existed 
requires an issuer to make a “factual inquiry.”56 One aspect of this factual 
inquiry is determining “appropriate cut-off dates.”57 Here intermediaries need 
to be careful to not be too involved. If an intermediary requires an issuer to use 
a specific period for purposes of “appropriate cut-off dates,” then perhaps the 
intermediary is more apt to be included in a lawsuit because it gave the 
recommendation. There is a fine line between helping issuers comply and not 
recommending or requiring things that the issuer can point to as something 
they relied on to their detriment. 
Intermediaries need also be aware of the possible liability that could arise 
from investor reliance.58 “[T]he proposed rules would require disclosure in the 
offering materials of matters that would have triggered disqualification had 
 
 55. Id. at 66,505 (referencing proposed Rule 503(b)(4) of Regulation Crowdfunding (§ 
227.503(b)(4))). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. (“The timeframe for inquiry also should be reasonable in relation to the 
circumstances of the offering and the participants. The objective would be for the issuer to gather 
information that is complete and accurate as of the time of the relevant transactions without 
imposing an unreasonable burden on the issuer or the other offering participants. With that in 
mind, we would expect issuers to determine the appropriate cut-off dates to apply when they 
make a factual inquiry, based upon the particular facts and circumstances of the offering and the 
participants involved, to determine whether any covered persons are subject to disqualification 
before seeking to rely on the exemption.”). 
 58. In the context of investor-intermediary relations, the SEC recognizes that there will be 
reliance on intermediaries: “We believe that if intermediaries take the measures we propose to 
require, investors would be more willing to participate in securities-based crowdfunding 
offerings.” Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,531. In other words, the SEC is acknowledging that 
investors will rely on intermediaries and their implied representation that issuers on their platform 
are not fraudulent or likely to commit fraud. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2014] WISDOM OF THE INTERMEDIARY CROWD 1157 
they occurred after the effective date of proposed Regulation Crowdfunding.”59 
The SEC thinks this disclosure “is particularly important because . . . investors 
may have the impression that all bad actors would now be disqualified from 
participating in offerings under Section 4(a)(6),” and so the SEC “expect[s] 
that issuers would give reasonable prominence to the disclosure to ensure that 
information about pre-existing bad actor events would be appropriately 
presented in the total mix of information available to investors.”60 Failure to 
disclose such information would not be insignificant.61 Therefore, an 
intermediary needs to treat the opportunity of regulatory flexibility as a 
challenge, not a null obligation, so that an intermediary will be best prepared to 
fend off potential lawsuits from not only the issuers but also the investors it 
works with. 
B. Requirements with Respect to Reducing Fraud 
Under Securities Act Section 4A(a)(5), an intermediary must take 
measures established by the SEC to decrease the risk of fraud “including 
obtaining a background and securities enforcement regulatory history check on 
each officer, director, and person holding more than 20 percent of the 
outstanding equity of every issuer whose securities are offered by such 
person.”62 To implement this provision, the SEC proposed requiring that an 
intermediary “have a reasonable basis for believing that the issuer is in 
compliance with relevant regulations and has established means to keep 
accurate records of holders of the securities it offers,” and “that the 
intermediary deny access if it believes the issuer or its offering would present a 
potential for fraud.”63 These proposed intermediary obligations will be 
discussed in order. 
“[T]he proposed rules would require an intermediary to have a reasonable 
basis for believing that an issuer . . . complies with the requirements in 
Securities Act Section 4A(b) and the related requirements in Regulation 
Crowdfunding.”64 The SEC proposes to require the intermediary to check the 
issuer’s compliance because “it would help to reduce the risk of fraud.”65 The 
SEC gives intermediaries significant flexibility here because it “permit[s] 
intermediaries to reasonably rely on representations of the issuer, absent 
 
 59. Id. at 66,506 (referencing proposed Rule 201(u) of Regulation Crowdfunding (§ 
227.201(u))). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 4A(a)(5), 48 Stat. 74. 
 63. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,461 (referencing proposed Rule 301 of Regulation 
Crowdfunding (§ 227.301)). 
 64. Id. at 66,461–62 (referencing proposed Rule 301(a) of Regulation Crowdfunding (§ 
227.301(a))). 
 65. Id. at 66,462. 
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knowledge or other information or indications that the representations are not 
true,” and the SEC did not propose any specific actions for intermediaries to 
take.66 
Intermediaries need to realize the opportunity of flexibility that the SEC 
imparts here, and intermediaries should not take this flexibility for granted.67 
At a minimum, intermediaries should adopt the crowdfunding platform 
RocketHub’s68 understanding of “reasonable basis,” which requires 
“adher[ing] to anti-discrimination laws when denying access to the 
intermediary’s platform,” because “discriminatory practices do not provide for 
a reasonable basis for disqualifying an issuer.”69 
There is a second “reasonable basis” requirement that intermediaries have 
with respect to ensuring issuer compliance, namely “to have a reasonable basis 
for believing that an issuer has established means to keep accurate records of 
the holders of the securities it would offer and sell through the intermediary’s 
platform.”70 This is no small task to ensure. The SEC was clear that “[t]he 
ability to keep track of the ownership of an issuer’s securities is necessary to 
protect investors and critical for maintaining the integrity of securities 
transactions made in reliance on Section 4(a)(6).”71 Though the 
CROWDFUND Act did not require this of intermediaries, the SEC chose to 
have intermediaries help share the issuers’ burden because “intermediaries 
would be well-positioned to make this determination.”72 
Again, the SEC is respectful of the ability of intermediaries to devise 
systems that work; the SEC again provides flexibility because it does “not 
propos[e] to require a particular form or method of recordkeeping of securities, 
nor . . . that an issuer use a transfer agent or any other third party.”73 The SEC 
has faith that “accurate recordkeeping can be accomplished by diligent issuers 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Stephenson, Knight & Bahleda, supra note 12, at 21 (“While [“verifying the 
statements made by an issuer prior to posting the issuer’s offering materials to the intermediary’s 
platform”] would go beyond the affirmative requirements for intermediaries set out in proposed 
Rule 301(a), the intermediary would be accepting a significant amount of business risk by not 
conducting such due diligence on each issuer.”) (footnote omitted). 
 68. RocketHub is on Forbes’ short list for social entrepreneur sites. Devin Thorpe, Eight 
Crowdfunding Sites For Social Entrepreneurs, FORBES (Sept. 10, 2012, 10:05 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/devinthorpe/2012/09/10/eight-crowdfunding-sites-for-social-entre 
preneurs/. RocketHub is also known for screening projects that are illegal or in bad taste. Putting 
Your Money Where Your Mouse Is, ECONOMIST (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/16909869?story_id=16909869&CFID=155277003&CFTOKEN =21314214. 
 69. ROCKETHUB WHITEPAPER 3.0, supra note 13, at 59. 
 70. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,462 (referencing proposed Rule 301(b) of Regulation 
Crowdfunding (§ 227.301(b))). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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or through a variety of third parties,” and the SEC even anticipates that a 
broker intermediary could provide such recordkeeping.74 An ambitious 
intermediary would offer issuers assistance with their recordkeeping 
compliance as a means of attracting issuers and distinguishing itself from 
fellow intermediaries that would not offer such assistance. An intermediary is 
especially well suited to handle an issuer’s recordkeeping because it is 
uncertain exactly what communication connection investors and issuers will 
have outside of the intermediary. For instance, at several points throughout the 
proposed rules, the SEC expressed doubt that an issuer will even have the 
email addresses of investors.75 
While intermediaries are permitted to “rely on an issuer’s representations 
concerning the [recordkeeping] means it has established, unless the 
intermediary has reason to question the reliability of the representations,” the 
SEC suggests a “range of functions” that would be important for keeping 
accurate records.76 In addition to, or more likely instead of checking to see if 
an issuer has any of the “range of functions,” an intermediary might simply 
handle the recordkeeping itself.77 This would allow an intermediary to have the 
 
 74. Id.; see also id. at n.354. 
 75. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,454 (“[W]e believe that many issuers may not have 
email addresses for investors.”); id. (Request for Comment No. 96) (“Would issuers have access 
to the investors’ email addresses?”); id. at 66,451 n.225 (“We believe that in order for the issuer 
to have email addresses for the investors, it would need to obtain those email addresses from the 
intermediary, since it would be the intermediary that would collect that information when a 
potential investor opens an account. In order for the issuer to have e-mail addresses after the 
shares issued pursuant to Section 4(a)(6) are traded, an issuer would need to collect that 
information from each new investor in connection with any sale of the issuer’s securities in a 
secondary market.”). In fact, one crowdfunding platform, Wefunder, makes clear that on its site 
“issuers will not have email addresses for investors,” though messages sent via Wefunder’s 
communication channel are also emailed to investors’ inboxes. Wefunder Letter 2, supra note 14. 
 76. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,462. 
Such functions could include, for example, the ability [of the issuer] to (1) monitor the 
issuance of the securities the issuer would offer and sell through the intermediary’s 
platform, (2) maintain a master security holder list reflecting the owners of those 
securities, (3) maintain a transfer journal or other such log recording any transfer of 
ownership, (4) effect the exchange or conversion of any applicable securities, (5) maintain 
a control book demonstrating the historical registration of those securities, and (6) 
countersign or legend physical certificates of those securities. 
Id. Additionally, an ambitious intermediary could extract from one of the SEC’s requests for 
comment that checking with FINRA’s BrokerCheck and the Commission’s Investment Adviser 
Public Disclosure program when performing background checks would be ideal. Id. at 66,464 
(Request for Comment No. 133). 
 77. See ROCKETHUB WHITEPAPER 3.0, supra note 13, at 59 (“The proposed rules should 
allow intermediaries to provide the necessary services to issuers, and investors for document, 
record keeping, and information sharing. This may be a for-fee service, and should be 
permitted.”). Though RocketHub thought that the proposed rules hampered this ability, 
RocketHub acknowledged that “[p]ortals are well positioned to offer ancillary services to issuers 
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best “reasonable basis” possible regarding an issuer’s compliance with 
recordkeeping requirements. Alternatively, an intermediary could vet third-
party recordkeeping services78 and then make recommendations to the issuer; 
perhaps an intermediary might even partner with such services or establish a 
relationship where the intermediary’s issuers could use recordkeeping services 
at a discount. 
Another way that intermediaries are required to help deter fraud is by 
conducting background checks on certain issuer persons, and intermediaries 
must: 
[D]eny access to its platform, if the intermediary has a reasonable basis for 
believing that an issuer, or any of its officers, directors (or any person 
occupying a similar status or performing a similar function) or 20 Percent 
Beneficial Owners, is subject to a disqualification under the proposed rules or 
if the intermediary believes that the issuer or the offering presents the potential 
for fraud or otherwise raises concerns regarding investor protection.79 
While the SEC recognizes that an intermediary might outsource portions of 
these background checks,80 the SEC preserves flexibility for intermediaries and 
is “not proposing to establish specific procedures for intermediaries to follow 
to reduce the risk of fraud beyond conducting the prescribed background and 
securities enforcement regulatory history checks.”81 Again, the SEC shows its 
faith in intermediaries. In allowing intermediaries this flexibility “to design 
systems and processes to help reduce the risk of fraud in securities-based 
crowdfunding,” the SEC cites intermediaries’ “judgment” and “concern for the 
reputational integrity of [their] platform[s] and crowdfunding.”82 
 
in an efficient manner that will improve the market, increase investor information and reduce 
transaction costs . . . . Crowdfunding platforms organically provide ancillary services to the 
benefit of users (soon to be issuers and investors).” Id. at 58. 
 78. Or, the intermediary could recommend recordkeeping software. See Letter from Jonathan 
Miller & Freeman White, Bd. Members, Crowdfund Intermediary Regulatory Advocates, to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (Feb. 3, 2014) [hereinafter 
Miller & White CFIRA Letter], available at http://www.cfira.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ 
CFIRA-Ongoing-Reporting-Requirements.pdf (“For decades, at least, there has been software 
that is available at a nominal charge to small companies to keep track of their securities 
transactions. The Division of Trading and Markets, which regulates the trading markets and 
transfer agents is well aware of, and does not object to non-12(g) companies keeping their own 
records, using software designed for that purpose, or using non-registered transfer agent third 
parties to perform those functions for them.”). 
 79. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,463 (referencing proposed Rule 301(c) of Regulation 
Crowdfunding (§ 227.301(c))). 
 80. The SEC “anticipate[s] that an intermediary may use the services of a third party to 
gather the information to conduct the required background and regulatory checks on issuers and 
their control persons.” Id. at 66,464. 
 81. Id. at 66,463. 
 82. Id. 
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Intermediaries should go above and beyond to keep the trust of the SEC 
because that will strengthen the probability that the SEC will allow the 
intermediaries flexibility going forward.83 An intermediary could follow part 
of a suggestion from RocketHub “to post the results of a background check 
alongside the issuance,” not disclosing personal information but designating 
“specific flag[s]” for categories such as “non-verified work history or 
academic background.”84 Intermediaries also should follow a second 
recommendation from RocketHub—permitting issuers “to opt into more 
premium background services, which go above the minimum requirements set 
by the Commission, the results of which could be displayed.”85 This allows 
issuers to control their costs or send an extra positive signal to the crowd. Truly 
ambitious intermediaries could also take a page from the crowdfunding 
platform Wefunder86 and “grill[] the founders face to face.”87 
Lastly, the proposed rule for denying an issuer the use of an intermediary’s 
platform if the intermediary simply believes there is a potential for fraud shows 
the strength of the SEC’s trust in the discretion of intermediaries. Even if the 
information an intermediary collects about an issuer does not trigger 
disqualification under the proposed rules, an intermediary’s belief that there is 
still a potential for fraud would require an intermediary to reject that issuer.88 
 
 83. See id. at 66,463 n.363. The SEC acknowledged a letter of the Crowdfund Intermediary 
Regulatory Advocates (CFIRA), summarizing it in a footnote as follows: 
[S]tating that because there is no mandated infrastructure that intermediaries are required 
to use, each intermediary should utilize an infrastructure that incorporates some type of 
fraud deterrence and fraud detection system, whether proprietary or licensed through a 
third party; that, in order to deter fraud, funding portals should have a video interface 
“whereby each issuer is required to give a short presentation on their business which is 
capable of being viewed live and saved for later viewing at any time by a potential 
investor;” and that in terms of detecting fraud, we should require intermediaries to build 
certain fraud detection systems into the functionality of their platforms. 
Id. (referencing and quoting Letter from Candace S. Klein, Chair, & Vincent R. Molinari, Co-
Chair, Crowdfund Intermediary Regulatory Advocates, to the U.S. Securities & Exchange 
Commission (May 30, 2012) [hereinafter Klein & Molinari CFIRA Letter], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-80.pdf). 
 84. ROCKETHUB WHITEPAPER 3.0, supra note 13, at 62. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Wefunder played an integral part in lobbying for the JOBS Act. WEFUNDER, https://we 
funder.com/wefunder (last visited Apr. 9, 2014). Wefunder explains their mission: “We help 
everyone invest in startups. It’s like Kickstarter, but with equity.” Top 10 Equity Crowdfunding 
Websites For Startups, CROWDCRUX, http://www.crowdcrux.com/top-10-equity-crowdfunding-
websites-for-startups/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2014). 
 87. Letter from Nicholas Tommarello, Chief Exec. Officer, Wefunder, to the U.S. Securities 
& Exchange Commission (Jan. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Wefunder Letter 1], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913-179.pdf. 
 88. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,463. 
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This belief is not even required to have a reasonable basis.89 Additionally, the 
SEC also requires an intermediary to reject an issuer “if [the intermediary] 
believes that it is unable to adequately or effectively assess the risk of fraud of 
the issuer or its potential offering.”90 
Equating flexibility in the context of reducing fraud with the SEC’s “trust” 
of intermediaries, however, is a rosy oversimplification. Intermediaries need to 
realize what these standards translate into when an intermediary is attached as 
a party to a lawsuit against a wrongful issuer. When the SEC or other 
enforcement body asks an intermediary why it did not deny a wrongful issuer, 
an intermediary will have to show that it did not even have a belief that there 
was potential for fraud. In such an instance, the ambitious intermediary that did 
not settle for the minimum requirements will be able to point to the extra steps 
it took as a robust basis for its belief and thereby be less likely to share in the 
wrongful issuer’s liability. 
C. Requirements with Respect to an Investor’s Account Opening 
This section discusses five aspects of an investor’s account opening: (1) 
requirements at account opening, (2) educational materials requirements, (3) 
requirements relating to promoters of a specific offering, (4) the importance of 
the new communication channel that the SEC proposed, and (5) the SEC’s 
desire for additional data about securities crowdfunding under Title III. 
1. Account Opening 
The proposed rules require that an investor create an account with an 
intermediary prior to investing, but the SEC declined to require an 
intermediary to gain any specific information from the investor.91 The SEC 
“anticipate[s] that at a minimum the intermediary would obtain basic 
identifying and contact information, such as full name, physical address and 
email address.”92 Here, again the SEC is respecting the ability and discretion of 
intermediaries by trusting them to collect the necessary information. 
Intermediaries need to realize how important investor contact information is; it 
is unclear whether or not issuers will even have investors’ contact information 
or that they will have a way of reaching their investors outside of the 
intermediary.93 In fact, “though communications among investors could occur 
outside the intermediary’s platform, communications by an investor with a 
crowdfunding issuer or its representatives about the terms of the offering 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 66,465. 
 92. Id. RocketHub would add to this list date of birth and social security number. 
ROCKETHUB WHITEPAPER 3.0, supra note 13, at 64. 
 93. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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would be required to occur through [an intermediary’s communication] 
channels.”94 A prudent intermediary should request multiple means of 
communication with investors; an intermediary cannot assume that if it is 
unable to reach a given investor it can simply ask the issuer to contact them—
the issuer relies on the intermediary as its vital link to its investors, not vice 
versa.95 
2. Educational Materials 
The SEC is also “proposing to require intermediaries to provide 
educational material about the types of securities available for purchase on 
their platforms and the risks associated with each type of security, including 
the risk of having limited voting power as a result of dilution”96 and “to 
provide educational material regarding the limitation on the amounts investors 
may invest pursuant to Section 4(a)(6)(B) and the proposed rules.”97 
While the SEC did not propose specific rules as to what this educational 
material should entail, this obligation is inherently linked to an intermediary’s 
duty to have a reasonable basis that an investor is in compliance with 
investment limits.98 Just as an issuer could be expected to drag an intermediary 
into an enforcement action against itself, an investor undergoing enforcement 
action will not hesitate to point a finger at the intermediary through which they 
invested.99 Undoubtedly, as enforcement evaluates whether an intermediary 
really could have had a reasonable basis that a given investor was compliant, 
enforcement will look to see how an intermediary carried out this obligation to 
provide educational material regarding investment limits to investors. The SEC 
 
 94. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,472 (referencing proposed Rule 204 of Regulation 
Crowdfunding (§ 227.204)). 
 95. See id. at 66,466 (discussing investors assuming that “following an offering conducted 
through the intermediary’s platform through which they purchased securities, the intermediary 
would be the primary contact for investors wishing to obtain information about, or wishing to 
communicate with, the issuer”). 
 96. Id. (referencing proposed Rule 302(b)(1)(ii) of Regulation Crowdfunding (§ 
227.302(b)(1)(ii))). 
 97. Id. (referencing proposed Rule 100(a)(2) of Regulation Crowdfunding (§ 
227.100(a)(2))). 
 98. Id. (referencing proposed Rule 303(b)(1) of Regulation Crowdfunding (§ 
227.303(b)(1))). 
 99. See, e.g., Stephenson, Knight & Bahleda, supra note 12, at 7 (“Securities professionals 
can imagine scenarios in which the failure to provide educational materials on a particular type of 
security purchased by a disgruntled investor could lead to legal action under the securities fraud 
rules, or could result in the loss of the exemption from registration. More likely, the intermediary 
would face sanction by the SEC for not complying with its obligations to conduct offerings under 
Section 4(a)(6).”) (footnote omitted). 
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is certainly not sending the message that “flexibility”100 means minimum-effort 
compliance. The SEC expressly rejected the suggestion of a commenter that “a 
disclaimer in isolation would be sufficient information to satisfy the statutory 
educational requirement.”101 
A prudent intermediary will see the investor educational requirements as a 
challenge to design something that would foreclose any possibility that the 
investor herself was unaware of the statutory limits. Because it “take[s its] 
responsibility to educate seriously,” Wefunder sets a high bar for ambitious 
intermediaries to follow: Wefunder “intend[s] to have a full-time team of 
writers constantly updating educational materials based on feedback and 
questions from [its] users.”102 
Reading between the lines, an ambitious intermediary can find suggestions 
as to what else to disclose in its educational materials. For example, though it 
did not adopt this recommendation, the SEC acknowledged a comment by the 
Crowdfund Intermediary Regulatory Advocates (CFIRA)103 that 
“intermediaries should be required to provide a glossary explaining each type 
of security available for purchase in each of the offerings on its portal.”104 
Perhaps following CFIRA’s recommendation to have a glossary page would be 
an ideal way to ensure that investors trying to learn about securities 
crowdfunding are informed, especially about their own obligations. 
These educational materials could also be a means of introducing every 
potential securities crowdfunding investor to both the SEC and FINRA105 at 
 
 100. In allowing intermediaries flexibility in the context of investor educational materials, the 
SEC reiterates its faith in intermediaries: “[W]e believe that the better approach is to provide each 
intermediary with sufficient flexibility to prepare educational materials in a manner reasonably 
designed to provide the required information, based on the types of offerings on the 
intermediary’s platform and the types of investors drawn to its platform.” Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 66,467; see also FINAL REPORT OF THE 2012 SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON 
SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION, SEC (Nov. 5, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
info/smallbus/gbfor31.pdf. The SEC acknowledges this report as “recommending that the market 
for transactions in reliance on Section 4(a)(6) should be permitted to develop best practices 
wherever possible.” Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,467 n.397. 
 101. Id. at 66,467 (referencing proposed Rule 303(b)(2)(i) of Regulation Crowdfunding (§ 
227.303(b)(2)(i))). 
 102. Wefunder Letter 2, supra note 14. 
 103. “CFIRA is an organization formed by the crowdfunding industry’s leading platforms and 
experts. The group will work with the [SEC and FINRA], and other affected governmental and 
quasi-governmental entities to help establish industry standards and best practices.” About 
CFIRA, CFIRA, http://www.cfira.org/?page_id=17 (last visited Apr. 9, 2014). 
 104. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,466 (referencing and quoting Klein & Molinari 
CFIRA Letter, supra note 83). 
 105. It is important to note that, while FINRA and the SEC work together in monitoring 
securities markets, FINRA is an independent regulator and the SEC is an administrative agency 
of the government. See About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2014); see also The Investor’s Advocate: 
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the outset. It is vital that investors realize the agencies and associations holding 
together the crowdfunding system. Knowing the major players in securities 
crowdfunding is a simple way to empower investors. These materials could 
also introduce potential investors to the North American Securities 
Administrators Association (NASAA), the state-level securities regulators who 
work closely with small businesses in their capital formation,106 especially 
because claims of fraud will most likely first be addressed by NASAA.107 
From the start, investors will know where to direct their complaints and 
concerns, and the data generated by those complaints will not be dissipated to 
the potentially unlimited places unsophisticated investors might think to 
 
How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, 
SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Apr. 9, 2014); Donna M. Nagy, Is 
the PCAOB a “Heavily Controlled Component” of the SEC?: An Essential Question in the 
Constitutional Controversy, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 361, 387 (2010) (noting that FINRA has 
substantial autonomy and that the SEC does not control FINRA at every significant step); Silver 
v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 352 (1963) (citation omitted) (quoting Justice William O. 
Douglas, former SEC Chairman, who said of the relationship between the SEC and self-
regulatory organizations such as FINRA: “[T]he exchanges take the leadership with Government 
playing a residual role. Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, 
loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would never have to be used.”). 
 106. Letter from Jack Herstein, President, North American Securities Administrators 
Association, Inc., to Marcia E. Asquith, Office Corp. Sec’y, Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority, Inc. (Aug. 31, 2012), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@ 
reg/@notice/documents/noticecomments/p163724.pdf. 
 107. The enforcement of violations of the Securities Act are often carried out at the state 
level; NASAA recognizes this as it notes to FINRA: “[T]he JOBS Act essentially puts state 
governments in the unfortunate position of enforcing federal laws from which we may not 
deviate.” Id. For example, NASAA cites that, in 2010, states brought more than 250 enforcement 
actions for fraudulent Rule 506 offerings. Letter from Jack Herstein, President, North American 
Securities Administrators Association, Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Securities & 
Exchange Commission (July 3, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-
ii/jobstitleii-40.pdf. After the JOBS Act was passed, crowdfunding was cited by NASAA as one 
of the top ten investor threats. Melanie Waddell, Lawmaker Calls SEC’s Delay on JOBS Act 
Promotion Rule ‘Completely Unacceptable,’ THINK ADVISOR (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.think 
advisor.com/2012/09/13/lawmaker-calls-secs-delay-on-jobs-act-promotion-ru. Matt Kitzi, former 
Missouri Securities Commissioner and former chair of NASAA’s Enforcement Section, noted 
that since the JOBS Act was passed “the number of entities pitching themselves as crowdfunding 
vehicles online has risen dramatically—from a couple hundred to about 1,700.” Id. As of January 
2013, NASAA was sifting through 9001 website names containing the word “crowdfund.” 
Eaglesham, supra note 5. After reviewing 2000 of these sites, NASAA had flagged roughly 200 
that needed further scrutiny. Id.; see also 158 CONG. REC. S1718–20 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2012) 
(statement of Sen. Landrieu) (introducing letter from NASAA to Senate Majority Leader Harry 
Reid and Minority Leader Mitch McConnell). With regards to H.R. 3606 (the House-passed 
version of the bill sent to the Senate), NASAA asked the Senate to make sure that the legislation 
did not “needlessly preempt state securities laws.” Id. at S1719. In other words, NASAA sought 
to ensure the Senate amendment took a tailored approach to how states were preempted because 
ultimately it was the states who act as the “cops on the beat.” Id. at S1720. 
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complain. Such data will also allow the SEC, FINRA, and NASAA to spot 
problem areas quickly and address them promptly so as to uphold the integrity 
of the securities crowdfunding market.108 
3. Promoters of Offerings 
The SEC also proposed requiring intermediaries to make investors aware 
when they open an account: 
[T]hat any person who promotes an issuer’s offering for compensation . . . or 
who is a founder or an employee of an issuer that engages in promotional 
activities on behalf of the issuer on the intermediary’s platform, must clearly 
disclose in all communications on the platform the receipt of the compensation 
and the fact that he or she is engaging in promotional activities on behalf of the 
issuer.109 
The SEC further explained that promoters must “disclose this information each 
time they post a comment in the communication channels on the platform.”110 
It is important that the intermediary satisfy the SEC’s proposals here, but a 
prudent and ambitious intermediary would not stop with a simple notice of 
such a requirement.111 Crowdfunding is premised on the “wisdom of the 
crowd,”112 and that wisdom hinges on accurate information and minimizing 
information asymmetry. If the crowd is unaware that a commenter on a given 
project is compensated for what she says, the crowd will not be able to 
properly discount such an opinion, and the “wisdom of the crowd” will be 
thwarted. Ambitious intermediaries will seek for ways to absolutely ensure that 
promoters, founders, and the like are clearly marked as such in the 
communication channels. The SEC suggested one such way: “[A]n 
 
 108. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,453 (“Monitoring the implementation of the 
crowdfunding exemption also would give the Commission more information to evaluate whether 
the rules include appropriate investor protections and facilitate capital formation.”); see also id. at 
66,524 (“The ability to efficiently collect information on all issuers also could provide an 
incentive for data aggregators or other market participants to offer services or analysis that 
investors could use to compare and choose among different offerings.”). 
 109. Id. at 66,467–68 (referencing proposed Rule 302(c) of Regulation Crowdfunding (§ 
227.302(c))). 
 110. Id. at 66,468 (referencing proposed Rule 303(c)(4) of Regulation Crowdfunding (§ 
227.303(c)(4))) (footnote omitted). 
 111. The Missouri Securities Commissioner, Andrew Hartnett, would like to extend this to an 
affirmative obligation of intermediaries. See Letter from Andrew M. Hartnett, Mo. Comm’r Sec., 
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (Feb. 3, 2014) 
[hereinafter Hartnett Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913-
242.pdf (requesting that the SEC “require that intermediaries prominently post the online 
identities of the issuer’s paid promoters in the provided communication channels”). 
 112. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,429 (citing Richard Waters, Startups Seek the 
‘Wisdom of Crowds,’ FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 3, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c1f1695c-
7da8-11e1-9adc-00144feab49a.html#axzz2b7QxIH5L). 
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intermediary could comply with this requirement in part by, for example, 
establishing a ‘pop-up’ window which reminds the investor of the requirement 
each time the investor accesses, or attempts to post a comment on, the 
communication channels on the intermediary’s platform.”113 This is no simple 
task because, as the SEC acknowledges, “after opening an account, an investor 
may come to be compensated by, or become an employee of, an issuer or 
potential issuer.”114 
Ensuring that promoters are identified, which is fundamental to the quality 
of the communication channel, is an area for exceptional intermediaries to 
shine. The intermediary is the vital link between the issuer and her investors. 
Practically, that link is the communication channel that the SEC proposes.115 If 
that communication channel is corrupted because it becomes known that a 
given intermediary is very poor at ensuring that different market players such 
as promoters are clearly identified, an intermediary is failing an issuer at the 
vital task of communication. Intermediaries that make such mistakes will not 
last. Online communities, which are integral to the wisdom of the crowd 
enabling successful crowdfunding,116 cannot survive in communication 
channels with unidentified promoters or founders. Perhaps the pop-up window 
the SEC mentioned or other machine-generated reminders are necessary.117 
Perhaps an intermediary will need to have employees troll through the 
communication channels for unidentified promoters.118 Additionally, the 
intermediary could make clear that it periodically checks communication 
 
 113. Id. at 66,468 n.403. 
 114. Id. (emphasis added). 
 115. See id. at 66,557 (§ 227.303(c). 
 116. Letter from Ethan Mollick, Professor, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 
to Dr. Ivanov (Dec. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Mollick Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/com 
ments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-189.pdf. Professor Mollick believes it is vital that “portals be 
required to either sustain or enable communities around crowdfunding efforts, including having 
persistent investor and commentator identities that remain after the initial funding of a new 
crowdfunded venture through the portal.” Id. Mollick believes such persistent communities are 
key to the success of sites such as Kickstarter because, among other things, they are helpful in 
fraud prevention. Id. 
 117. See also ROCKETHUB WHITEPAPER 3.0, supra note 13, at 7 (“Notice to investors can be 
achieved by highlighting comments or postings by promoters or affiliates of the issuer.”); see also 
id. at 70 (“For example, with a simple checkbox, a poster can allow the intermediary to visually 
highlight the post as one made by a founder or employee.”); see also Hartnett Letter, supra note 
111, at 2 (“[A]n intermediary could format its communication channels to always display the paid 
promoters’ onscreen names, along with other information such as the issuer’s name, security, and 
offering amount,” or “some intermediaries could configure their communication channels to 
display paid promoters’ names and onscreen communications in noticeably different font or text 
color to signal their relationship to the issuer.”). 
 118. See ROCKETHUB WHITEPAPER 3.0, supra note 13, at 70 (“Furthermore, the intermediary 
must have the right to block and remove the comment of any user who is using the public forum 
for advertising or promotional purposes.”). 
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channel participants at random to ensure they are who they purport to be.119 
Wefunder expresses doubt at the efficacy of requesting promoters to identify 
themselves at account opening.120 To address this concern, an intermediary 
might also follow Wefunder’s suggestion that “as soon as a user clicks on the 
text field to make a comment in the communication channels . . . [t]he sudden 
appearance of text underneath the comment box” can be used to draw the 
promoter’s eye.121 Then the promoter could simply click a link to disclose their 
status.122 In any event, intermediaries should not hesitate to dole out a hefty 
penalty to offenders such as banishment from the platform.123 
Additionally, a prudent intermediary, recognizing that an issuer also has an 
obligation to make sure promoters are disclosed,124 should require that an 
issuer provide the intermediary with all the names of founders and promoters 
and update this list of names throughout the offering.125 The intermediary 
could also require that the issuer contract with all promoters along certain 
lines. The SEC acknowledged that an issuer might “contractually require any 
promoter to include the required statement about receipt of compensation, 
confirm that the promoter is adhering to the intermediary’s terms of use that 
require promoters to affirm whether or not they are compensated by the issuer, 
 
 119. See id. at 5 (“Portals must also maintain the ability to ‘police’ their own platforms for 
inappropriate content. For example, nearly every web-based business, which allows users to post 
comments or content, moderates the forums where content is posted. Intermediaries must be 
allowed to remove content that is unlawful, harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, defamatory, 
vulgar, obscene, invasive of another’s privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically or otherwise 
objectionable. Intermediaries must also be allowed to suspend or ban users who repeatedly abuse 
the system.”). 
 120. See Wefunder Letter 2, supra note 14 (“As .01% of our users at the account opening 
stage are likely to be promoters, and 99.9% potential investors, we believe the text at the account 
opening stage is better devoted to discussin [sic] the risks of startup investing. We don’t want to 
have a lot of fine print that no one reads.”). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See, e.g., Hartnett Letter, supra note 111 (recommending that the SEC “consider 
amending the rule to disqualify any issuer from the exemption for a specified time if that issuer 
pays any promoter who (1) is not disclosed to the intermediary and (2) promotes the offering in 
the communication channels”). 
 124. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,555 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R pt. 227) (§ 227.205(a)). 
 125. CFIRA recommends as a best practice “that all issuers, and officers, directors, and other 
agents, identify themselves in all communications on such platform.” Letter from Joy Schoffler, 
Bd. Member, & Kim Wales, Exec. Bd. Member, Crowdfund Intermediary Regulatory Advocates, 
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, at 2–3 (Jan. 27, 2014), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913-269.pdf; see also Hartnett Letter, 
supra note 111, at 2–3 (calling on the SEC to “amend the proposed rules to require issuers to 
provide intermediaries notice of who their paid promoters are” because “the issuer is best 
positioned to establish both who its paid promoters are and that the required notice is provided to 
the intermediary”). 
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[and] monitor communications made by such persons.”126 An intermediary 
could also require that an issuer contractually require its promoters to “take the 
necessary steps to have any communications that do not have the required 
statement removed promptly from the communication channels, or retain a 
person specifically identified by the intermediary to promote all issuers on its 
platform.”127 
4. Importance of the Communication Channel 
Intermediaries are required by the SEC’s proposal to provide 
communication channels, the importance of which cannot be overstated.128 The 
SEC “believe[s] that requiring the communications channel to be on the 
intermediary’s platform would allow investors, particularly those who might 
be less familiar with online social media, to participate in online discussions 
regarding ongoing offerings without having to actively search for such 
discussions on external Web sites.”129 It is a possibility, however, that 
investors without online savvy could miss out on what other investors are 
saying because investors are “not preclude[d] . . . from initiating additional 
discussions on external Web sites.”130 The SEC recognizes the importance of 
the conversations that investors and others have and where they might take 
place: “[I]t is likely that investors and interested participants would provide 
relevant adverse information about an issuer or an offering through postings on 
chat sites, message boards, and other communication channels, including, but 
not limited to, the communication channels to be provided by the 
intermediary.”131 Then, so as not to “lessen the incentive for an intermediary to 
thoroughly investigate,” the SEC notes something very scary for 
intermediaries: “These media would provide a potential source of information 
for intermediaries who may be subject to liability as ‘issuers.’”132 
A prudent intermediary reading this statement by the SEC will see two key 
takeaways. First—and this ties back to the previous section discussing vetting 
issuers—minimalistic background checks of issuers will not suffice. If the 
crowd discovers and posts bad information about an issuer—even if it posts 
this information outside of an intermediary’s platform—an intermediary will 
be expected to know about this, verify it, and then act accordingly. If the 
 
 126. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,456. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. at 66,557 (§ 227.303(c)); see also id. at 66,471–72. 
 129. Id. at 66,530. 
 130. Id. That said, issuers can only communicate with investors about an offering via the 
communication channel. Id. at 66,472. 
 131. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,531. 
 132. Id. 
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information is true, it will tarnish an intermediary’s reputation that such an 
issuer was even allowed access in the first place. 
Second, an ambitious intermediary will resolve to design the best 
communication channels possible. These channels need to be so effective and 
user-friendly that investors have little or no reason to go elsewhere to discuss a 
given offering. In designing these channels, intermediaries need to have ever-
before them the policy driving the requirement that only investors with 
accounts can post in the channels,133 namely the need “to establish 
accountability for comments made in the communication channels.”134 In 
addition to the requirements to indicate whether a commenter in the 
communication channel is a founder or employee, or a promoter or an 
issuer,135 an intermediary should take the more general suggestions of Senator 
Brown: “Investors’ credentials should be included with their comments to aid 
the collective wisdom of the crowd.”136 An intermediary might model its 
communication channel after Wefunder’s two-part version, with the most 
important and active channel being an “Ask a Question,” which only the issuer 
can answer.137 This is in keeping with Wefunder’s belief that “[o]ne of the 
most important criteria for startup investments is the quality of the [issuer’s] 
team, and their ability to answer critical questions.”138 
Even after designing such an ideal communication channel, intermediaries 
need to help issuers understand how to respond to messages from outside of 
the communication channel, especially because the SEC proposed to require 
that issuers “disclose information about . . . how interested parties may contact 
the issuer.”139 Intermediaries should remind issuers of the requirement that all 
the issuer’s communications regarding the offering must take place in the 
communication channel on the intermediary’s platform so that no investor is 
privy to more information than any other investor.140 The crowdfunding 
platform RocketHub foresees that “[i]ndividuals may publicly tweet an issuer, 
or post a question on their Facebook account.”141 “If the question pertains to 
the offering,” intermediaries should inform issuers to handle this situation as 
RocketHub recommends: “[T]he issuer can respond to the investor with a link 
 
 133. Id. at 66,472. 
 134. Id.; see also Mollick Letter, supra note 116. 
 135. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,472. 
 136. Id. at 66,472 n.436 (referencing 158 CONG. REC. S2231 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2012) 
(statement of Sen. Scott Brown)). Wefunder warns that “not a single anonymous forum is 
effective at providing intelligent critiques.” Wefunder Letter 2, supra note 14. 
 137. Wefunder Letter 2, supra note 14. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,438 (referencing proposed Rule 201(a) of Regulation 
Crowdfunding (§ 227.201(a))). 
 140. Id. at 66,472 (referencing proposed Rule 204 of Regulation Crowdfunding (§ 227.204)). 
 141. ROCKETHUB WHITEPAPER 3.0, supra note 13, at 69. 
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that directs the investor to the public communication channel on the 
intermediary platform.”142 
There is another reason why an intermediary should provide robust 
communication channels that clearly identify the parties as the SEC proposes. 
The SEC “believe[s] it would be contrary to the intent and purpose of the 
statute and the proposed rules to declare an offering ‘sold’ on the basis of non-
bona fide sales designed to create the appearance of a successful completion of 
the offering.”143 “[N]on-bona fide purchases would include purchases by the 
issuer through nominee accounts or purchases by persons whom the issuer has 
agreed to guarantee against loss.”144 The SEC is “not restricting directors and 
officers of an issuer from purchasing securities in an offering,” but it 
“expect[s] intermediaries to scrutinize any purchases by these individuals for 
‘red flags,’ such as repeated investment commitments and cancellations, that 
would indicate that the purchase was designed to create an impression that the 
offering has reached, or will reach, its target amount.”145 
RocketHub had identified this problem as “pump and dump,” whereby 
“[a]n unscrupulous issuer could have fake investors ‘pump up’ the campaign 
by committing large dollar amounts up front, in order to create the appearance 
of momentum, thereby attracting other investors.”146 Then, those initial 
investors could slowly rescind their investments while new investors join the 
faux-investing momentum.147 
RocketHub viewed this problem arising if the rescission period was too 
long, but “[t]he proposed rules . . . would give investors an unconditional right 
to cancel an investment commitment for any reason until 48 hours prior to the 
deadline identified in the issuer’s offering materials.”148 The SEC saw this as a 
balanced solution that would “giv[e] investors the continuing benefit of the 
collective views of the crowd . . . while providing issuers with certainty about 
their ability to close an offering.”149 The fact that investors are given so long to 
deduct from the wisdom of the crowd shows that the SEC understands Senator 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,474 (internal citations omitted). 
 144. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 145. Id. (internal citations omitted) (referencing proposed Rule 301(c)(2) of Regulation 
Crowdfunding (§ 227.301(c)(2))). 
 146. ROCKETHUB, REGULATION OF CROWDFUNDING: BUILDING ON THE JUMPSTART OUR 
BUSINESS STARTUPS ACT 7 (May 2012) [hereinafter ROCKETHUB WHITEPAPER], available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/noticecomments/p1637
15.pdf; see also Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,476 nn.489–90 (SEC acknowledging pumping 
schemes). Others also recognize the possible threat of “pump and dump” schemes. See, e.g., 
Mollick Letter, supra note 116. 
 147. ROCKETHUB WHITEPAPER, supra note 146, at 7. 
 148. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,476 (referencing proposed Rule 304(a) of Regulation 
Crowdfunding (§ 227.304(a))). 
 149. Id. 
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Merkey’s distinction: “[T]he ‘wisdom of the crowd’. . . [is different] than 
perhaps just the ‘excitement of the crowd.’”150 
In other words, because of the SEC’s proposed rescission rule, pump-and-
dump or non-bona fide purchases remain a very real threat for intermediaries 
to guard against.151 Such schemes are the kind of thing that could be easily 
pulled from the data in retrospect (i.e., during a lawsuit), but easy enough to 
miss as the campaign is underway. Pump-and-dump is perhaps one of the most 
likely forms of fraud: even an issuer who completely checks out as far as 
background and experience is capable of committing such fraud. Knowing and 
clearly identifying anyone participating is the best way to guard against this 
fraud.152 
Everyone wins if the discussion stays in the intermediary’s communication 
channel: unsophisticated investors do not need to familiarize themselves with 
searching other forums to make sure they have the complete picture; issuers 
are allowed to address everything within the communication channels; 
intermediaries are able to monitor the discussions and make sure that 
promoters are properly identified, that improper comments are removed, and 
that pump-and-dump schemes are not being employed; and the data153 of the 
deliberations is preserved in one place.154 
As to the preservation of data, in one of its requests for comments, the SEC 
reveals that it is considering whether to require an “intermediary to maintain 
 
 150. Id. at 66,476 n.496 (referencing 158 CONG. REC. S5477 (daily ed. July 26, 2012) 
(statement of Sen. Jeff Merkley)). 
 151. ROCKETHUB WHITEPAPER 3.0, supra note 13, at 11 (“The Commission’s proposal 
leaves investors open to considerable risk of ‘pump & rescind’ schemes. It also leaves issuers at 
risk of ‘short fall’ situations.”). 
 152. Another important reason to know who the investors are stems from a comment that the 
SEC recognized that warned “a competitor could commit to invest and then cancel that 
commitment at a critical moment during the fundraising effort, causing the offering to fall short 
of the target offering amount.” Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,476 n.493 (referencing Letter 
from Marshall Neel, Co-Founder, Crowdfunding Offerings, Ltd., to the U.S. Securities & 
Exchange Commission (May 11, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-
59.htm). Indeed, Wefunder has confirmed that this is a real problem: “Startups on our platform 
have seen investment applications from employees of competitors, as well as clearly deranged 
individuals.” Wefunder Letter 1, supra note 87. To counter such a dilemma, RocketHub 
recommends that “invitation-only offerings” be allowed so that an issuer has the “right to not 
permit a competitor from investing in the offering through an intermediary.” ROCKETHUB 
WHITEPAPER 3.0, supra note 13, at 20. 
 153. The SEC is adamant about collecting as much data as possible about securities 
crowdfunding so that it can be analyzed to see if the purposes of the JOBS Act are truly being 
implemented. See, e.g., Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,507 (“With regard to any comments, 
we note that such comments are of particular assistance to us if accompanied by supporting data 
and analysis of the issues addressed in those comments.”). 
 154. See supra note 108. 
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the communication channels of its platform during the post-offering period.”155 
An ambitious intermediary would see an opportunity to go above and beyond 
here by maintaining these communication channels indefinitely.156 Issuers 
would especially find this feature of an intermediary attractive as an 
intermediary is an issuer’s communication lifeline to its investors. Also, these 
channels could help enforcement if ever the need arose. Maintaining the 
communication channels post-offering would be especially ideal if an 
intermediary was also going to serve as the platform for the secondary 
market.157 
5. Desire for Demographic Data 
The SEC thinly veils a desire for intermediaries to collect other investor 
information, which may not be necessary for securities crowdfunding but 
which “could help [the SEC] and the applicable national securities association 
to better understand the level of investor sophistication in this market and 
investor protection needs, among other things.”158 The SEC suggests that 
“demographic information about investors that excludes any personally 
identifiable information and is aggregated on a per offering basis, indicating 
characteristics such as education level, income, wealth, geographic distance 
from the issuer and professional affiliations” might “help in the evaluation of 
the effectiveness of crowdfunding in raising capital for startups and small 
businesses.”159 
An ambitious intermediary should consider this thinly veiled hint as 
something extra it could do to assist the SEC. Throughout the proposed rules 
the SEC reiterates that “data and analysis” are “of particular assistance.”160 An 
intermediary could include questions about the demographic information that 
the SEC suggested, but an intermediary should make clear to investors that 
disclosing such information is optional.161 That said, an intermediary might 
 
 155. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,473 (Request for Comment No. 170). 
 156. Indeed this would comport with CFIRA recommended Best Practices. CFIRA, 
CROWDFUNDING BEST PRACTICES FOR PORTALS OPERATING PURSUANT TO TITLE II AND TITLE 
III OF THE JOBS ACT, SEC (Nov. 15, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-
title-iii/jobstitleiii-204.pdf (“Offering Retention and Display – regardless of whether an offering is 
successful or cancelled, it should be retained by the Portal and accessible online indefinitely, as it 
is part of the public record. And issuers should not be permitted to delete or alter an offering 
memorandum in any way once it has been closed, cancelled or expired.”). 
 157. Clearly funding portal intermediaries are not allowed to host secondary markets; they are 
exclusively allowed to handle Section 4(a)(6) offerings, which are primary market transactions, 
not resales. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,459. 
 158. Id. at 66,468 (Request for Comment No. 152). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See supra notes 108 and 153. 
 161. Perhaps an intermediary could use the prevalent format of boxes or blanks marked with 
asterisks signifying required information, whereas those without asterisks are voluntary. 
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find good reason not to require any extra information. Wefunder minces no 
words in its compelling opposition to collecting unrequired information: 
“[E]ach additional input decreases cash available to startups,” because “[n]o 
one likes filling out long forms” and “each additional input box on a form 
decreases the likelihood that it will be filled out.”162 
D. Requirements with Respect to Transactions 
Within the context of the actual crowdfunding transaction, this section 
discusses requirements relating to (1) information about an issuer, (2) an 
investor’s qualification, (3) an investor’s acknowledgement of risk, and (4) the 
maintenance and transmission of funds. 
1. Issuer Information 
The SEC proposed requiring that intermediaries “make available to the 
Commission and to potential investors any information required to be provided 
by the issuer under Rules 201 and 203(a) of proposed Regulation 
Crowdfunding.”163 The SEC is “not requiring that intermediaries make the 
relevant information available in any particular format,” but it reminds 
intermediaries “that issuers would be required to file the information on 
EDGAR.”164 Therefore, an intermediary that wants to attract issuers should 
help issuers design their campaigns in such a way that allows issuers to toggle 
back and forth between their campaigns and their EDGAR filings. This is 
easier said than done,165 but it is another way that an intermediary could 
 
 162. Wefunder Letter 2, supra note 14. 
 163. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,468–69. 
 164. Id. at 66,469 n.407 (referencing proposed Rule 203 of Regulation Crowdfunding (§ 
227.203)). EDGAR stands for the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system, and 
it is where certain documents required to be filed with the SEC are electronically filed. Important 
Information About EDGAR, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm (last updated Feb. 
16, 2010). 
 165. Letter from Mary Juetten, Joy Schoffler, Trey Bowles, Bd. Members, & Kim Wales, 
Exec. Bd. Member, Crowdfund Intermediary Regulatory Advocates, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Sec’y, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (Jan. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Juetten, Schoffler, 
Bowles & Wales CFIRA Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913-
254.pdf (“We believe that all types of information, delivered in a variety of ways . . . should be on 
[an] intermediary’s platform. Our understanding is that EDGAR does not allow for filing of 
videos and graphics; however, we do not believe that everything on the intermediary site needs to 
be filed on EDGAR.”); see also Letter from Sara Hanks, Chief Exec. Officer, CrowdCheck, Inc., 
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission 3 (Jan. 9, 2014) 
[hereinafter Hanks CrowdCheck Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-
13/s70913-107.pdf (“As EDGAR is currently configured, it can only accept a limited range of file 
formats. Videos, for example, cannot be filed on EDGAR, and yet videos are likely to be an 
important component of a securities crowdfunding offering. Videos present particular challenges 
with respect to issues of liability. In the words of the old saw, ‘a picture is worth a thousand 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2014] WISDOM OF THE INTERMEDIARY CROWD 1175 
provide value, thereby attracting more issuers. This ability to toggle back and 
forth or to help issuers understand their campaign in terms of their EDGAR 
filings and vice versa will serve issuers especially well when they have to file 
updates or their required ongoing disclosure.166 
Intermediaries need to realize the unique challenges of disclosing 
information about issuers. The proposed rules require disclosing the business 
experience of issuers’ directors and officers over the past three years. 
Intermediaries need to be aware of something Wefunder noted: “[M]any high 
growth startup founders are so young that they do not have three years of work 
experience . . . .”167 Intermediaries should focus on whatever work experience 
these officers and directors have so as not to “unreasonably prejudice investors 
against them.”168 
Further, intermediaries need to realize that, with brand new startups that 
have little or no operating history, the most meaningful disclosures from an 
investor’s standpoint are “how much cash is in the bank, [the startup’s] current 
monthly loss (i.e., ‘burn rate’), and how much anticipated ‘runway’ the startup 
has until more capital is required.”169 Intermediaries might also follow one of 
Wefunder’s habits, namely to “post[] all news articles [it] can find to a 
fundraising profile,” and continue to do so even after the round closes.170 
Intermediaries should also choose to save public data from issuers’ 
campaigns. The SEC asked whether “some or all of the issuer’s offering 
materials be required to remain on an intermediary’s platform after the close of 
an offering.”171 The SEC recognizes that data on intermediaries will not 
necessarily be maintained indefinitely.172 While it is wise that the SEC 
recognizes this, an ambitious intermediary would be wiser to assist the SEC in 
 
words,’ and a video may be worth many more. It is possible to imagine a small software company 
giving the impression that it has many more employees than is actually the case by filming the 
CEO’s presentation in front of a bank of workers in a co-working space. Or a video could show a 
loading bay filled with boxes, giving the impression of inventory ready to ship, whereas in fact 
the boxes are empty. A transcript cannot capture the statements that are made purely by visual 
means. In the event of litigation or enforcement, visual elements may be material.”); see also 
Wefunder Letter 2, supra note 14 (“There will be text, videos, interactive graphics, charts, and 
graphics. Our goal is to enable a beautiful online presentation in rich HTML and give investors as 
much relevant information about an issuer as possible. . . . It will not be practical to embed videos 
and interactive graphics . . . in Form C filings, nor will the visual presentation be the same. More 
practical will be including a URL to the source material. While a video may be linked to directly, 
for technical reasons, some interactive exhibits will only work if loaded within the profile.”). 
 166. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,554 (§ 227.202(a)). 
 167. Wefunder Letter 2, supra note 14. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,469 (Request for Comment No. 157). 
 172. Id. at 66,449. 
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its goal of preserving Section 4(a)(6) data173 by establishing a policy that it 
would not remove any campaigns or their relevant data from its platform, as 
CFIRA Best Practices recommended.174 
2. Investor Qualification 
Section 4A(a)(6) obligates intermediaries to ensure that investors do not 
exceed the investor limits of Section 4(a)(6)(B). “[T]he proposed rules provide 
that an intermediary may rely on an investor’s representations concerning 
compliance with investment limitation requirements.”175 The SEC qualifies 
this by noting: “[I]t would not be reasonable for an intermediary to ignore 
other investments made by an investor in securities sold in reliance on Section 
4(a)(6) through an account with that intermediary or other information or facts 
about an investor within its possession.”176 In light of this, intermediaries will 
want to ensure that investor accounts are unique so that they can track 
compliance at least within their platform. An intermediary could take some 
recommendations from the Grow VC letter that the SEC recognized, which 
highlighted the danger “that an investor may be able to establish multiple user 
accounts with a single intermediary and thereby exceed the maximum 
investment limit.”177 Grow VC recommended that an intermediary could guard 
against this by “closely monitoring investment activity in any user account; 
requiring each user account to provide unique bank account details which are 
not used by any other user account; and requiring the investor to represent and 
warrant that such investor understands the maximum investment limit and will 
not exceed such limits.”178 
Intermediaries that want to go the extra step could have a simple (even 
automated) process whereby they could provide a certificate to an investor 
stating how much the investor has invested as of what date. An investor could 
then submit this statement to a new intermediary where she seeks to open an 
 
 173. See supra notes 108 and 153. 
 174. See supra note 156. 
 175. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,470. Wefunder applauds the SEC for this 
recommendation because, in the “over $3.5 million in investment applications for 506(c) 
offerings in amounts as low as $100,” Wefunder has found that “[a]bout 80% of these potential 
investors refused to verify their income with documentation.” Wefunder Letter 1, supra note 87. 
Wefunder is not surprised that investors show such resistance “[i]n an era when Target leaks 40 
million credit cards.” Id. Wefunder’s Target comment is bolstered by the recent hacking of the 
major crowdfunding platform Kickstarter. Andrew Dowell, Kickstarter Says a Computer Attack 
Breached the Funding Site’s User Data, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2014, at B5. 
 176. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,470. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 66,470 n.417 (referencing Letter from Jouko Ahvenainen & Valto Loikkanen, Co-
founders, Grow VC, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission 
(June 15, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-88.pdf). 
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additional account. This would bolster the new intermediary’s reasonable basis 
for accepting an investor’s representation, and it would tip off the initial 
intermediary that one of its investors was also opening an account elsewhere. 
Ideally, this could develop as an industry best practice where intermediaries 
would come to require that investors present such a certificate from the other 
intermediaries where they also have accounts.179 
3. Investor’s Acknowledgement of Risk 
Section 4A(a)(4) requires intermediaries to ensure that investors are aware 
of the risk they are undertaking in securities crowdfunding. An intermediary is 
statutorily required to make sure that investors review the educational 
materials, affirm the risk they are taking on, and answer questions 
demonstrating their understanding of the risk. Fortunately for intermediaries, 
the SEC understands intermediaries’ limitations: “[I]t would not be possible 
for an intermediary to ensure that all investors understand the risk 
disclosure.”180 The SEC clarifies that the goal is “provid[ing] investors with 
meaningful disclosures.”181 
Nonetheless, the SEC declined to propose a model form of 
acknowledgement or questionnaire that intermediaries could have used to 
satisfy the requirements of section 4A(a)(4).182 In support of this grant of 
flexibility, the SEC acknowledges the ideal positioning and experience of 
intermediaries: “As with the educational material requirements, we believe that 
an intermediary’s familiarity with its business and likely investor base would 
make it best able to determine the format in which to present the material 
required under the proposed rules.”183 
 
 179. Alternatively, intermediaries could use the services of CrowdBouncer, a crowdfunding 
compliance company that has created an application programming interface (API) to help “portals 
to track investors’ investments across the whole Title III universe.” Title III Database, 
CROWDBOUNCER, https://www.crowdbouncer.com/title-iii-database (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
A competitor of CrowdBouncer, Crowdentials, also plans to offer services in assisting with 
investor compliance under Title III just as it is already providing investor services under Title II 
of the JOBS Act. Equity Crowdfunding Compliance Solutions, CROWDENTIALS, 
http://crowdentials.com/titleIII.php?title=3 (last visited Mar. 15, 2014); see also Lora Kolodny, 
Crowdentials Wants to Make Investor Verification ‘TurboTax Easy’ Online, VENTURE CAP. 
DISPATCH, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2014, 2:21 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2014/01/ 
13/crowdentials-wants-to-make-investor-verification-turbotax-easy-online/. 
 180. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,471. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. (referencing proposed Rule 303(b)(2)(i) of Regulation Crowdfunding (§ 
227.303(b)(2)(i))). Throughout the proposed rules the SEC acknowledges instances where the 
intermediary is best positioned to do a certain task. See id. at 66,531 (“We believe that 
intermediaries will be in the best position to take these steps and that these requirements will 
increase investor protections.”); see also id. at 66,532 (“We believe that intermediaries would be 
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An ambitious intermediary could follow some of RocketHub’s 
recommendations when it comes to disclosing risks to investors. RocketHub 
identifies four risks it wishes to make investors aware of. First, “100% of the 
funds invested are at risk because the business may fail.”184 Second, “[e]ven if 
the business is ‘successful,’ the investor may never get any money back 
because either: a) [t]he business never becomes successful enough, or b) [i]f 
investor payout (or other structure) is not guaranteed, management may decide 
there are better uses for the funds.”185 Third, “[t]he investor may not have any 
say in how the business is run.”186 Fourth, “[t]he investor may not be able to 
sell his/her stake in the business either because a) [n]o one wants to buy, or b) 
[i]t may be difficult to find a willing purchaser, or c) [i]t may be difficult to 
transfer.”187 RocketHub plans to “maximize [investor] engagement while 
presenting the educational content” by “us[ing] interactive text and images, 
time tracking, click tracking, and live webinars to make the material easy to 
understand and retain.”188 In addition to these important recommendations, 
intermediaries need to understand that requiring the acknowledgement of risks 
is a balancing act, which can lead to more investor risk if not done correctly.189 
As with other areas of flexibility, this opportunity can also be seen as a 
burden. If a disgruntled investor decides to sue an intermediary, courts will 
scrutinize the disclosures that a particular intermediary chose to provide. 
Intermediaries that took “flexibility” as a null obligation or as an excuse to 
only do the bare minimum will likely not fare as favorably, regardless of the 
propriety of the investor’s lawsuit. 
4. Maintenance and Transmission of Funds 
Section 4A(a)(7) only allows an intermediary to provide an issuer with its 
funds if the issuer has met or exceeded190 its target offering amount. Despite 
 
in an appropriate position to take such steps.”); see also id. at 66,472 (“[I]ntermediaries . . . would 
be well placed to take measures to ensure . . . .”). 
 184. ROCKETHUB WHITEPAPER 3.0, supra note 13, at 65. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 66. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Wefunder makes this point. See Wefunder Letter 2, supra note 14. Wefunder encourages 
its investors to diversify their investments, and often investors heed this advice and “invest in up 
to 10 companies in one day after spending a week or two reviewing all the opportunities on the 
platform.” Id. Wefunder expresses concern that, “[i]f investment commitments feel laborious 
because investors are forced to constantly reacknowledge the risks,” investors might “‘get tired’ 
of filling out forms and not finish diversifying.” Id. 
 190. As an aside, intermediaries should certainly recommend that issuers establish, in addition 
to their target amount, a maximum cap within the same disclosure requirement tier as the target 
amount, which the proposed rules permit. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,457 
(proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (referencing proposed Rule 201(h) of Regulation Crowdfunding (§ 
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one commenter’s recommending that credit cards not be an acceptable 
payment mechanism,191 the SEC is “not proposing to limit payment 
mechanisms.”192 The SEC acknowledged the commenter’s concern that 
charge-back options on credit cards could complicate the funding process, and 
the SEC said an intermediary is allowed to decline credit cards.193 
A prudent intermediary should give serious thought as to whether to accept 
or decline credit cards; this is a difficult decision for an intermediary to make 
as it seeks to appeal to issuers.194 An issuer will want the assurance that funds 
committed will not be reneged due to charge-backs, but at the same time, 
issuers will not want their investors to have another restraint on their ability to 
contribute. From the intermediary’s standpoint, the intermediary wants the 
issuer’s campaign to meet its goal, but it also realizes that using a credit card is 
a way for unsophisticated investors to overextend themselves. In some ways, 
an intermediary would be doing investors a (paternalistic) favor by not 
allowing them to use credit cards. From an interest standpoint, it does not make 
sense for an investor to use credit to invest if that credit is costing them on 
average fourteen percent interest.195 To make the investment worthwhile, the 
investor would now need a return greater than fourteen percent. The odds are 
not in an investor’s favor, and the most likely result is that an intermediary 
finds itself with more disgruntled investors that might drag the intermediary 
into court over the matter. 
If intermediaries opt to allow credit cards, they should plan for how they 
will deal with charge-backs after issuers’ campaigns have completed because 
 
227.201(h))). Wefunder exhorts issuers to “take the advice of Paul Graham, an investor in over 
500 startups collectively worth $14.4 billion, who wrote, ‘It’s a mistake to have fixed plans in an 
undertaking as unpredictable as fundraising. The right strategy, in fundraising, is to have multiple 
plans depending on how much you can raise.’” Wefunder Letter 1, supra note 87. 
 191. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,474 & n.465 (citing ROCKETHUB WHITEPAPER, supra 
note 146). 
 192. Id. at 66,474. 
 193. Id. RocketHub would also like the SEC to understand that there is a cost involved: 
“[A]ccepting funds from users comes at a considerable cost to the intermediary, and in the 
situation of a cancelled investment commitment, the intermediary or issuer may have to 
potentially bear this unavoidable cost.” ROCKETHUB WHITEPAPER 3.0, supra note 13, at 73. 
 194. See ROCKETHUB WHITEPAPER 3.0, supra note 13, at 74 (“Permitting debt-based 
payment vehicles, such as credit cards, which have their own rescission policies, (i.e. charge 
backs) is problematic. . . . Less experienced Portals may be unaware of the risk to which 
accepting debt-based payments exposes them and issuers, and may generate serious 
misperceptions in the market, that will in the long-run jeopardize the viability of the marketplace, 
as well as expose issuers to significant fees.”). 
 195. See Ruth Simon, Credit-Card Rates Climb: Levels Hit Nine-Year High as New Rules 
Limiting Penalty Fees Help Fuel Rise, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/news/ 
articles/SB10001424052748704094704575443402132987676 (“[T]he average interest rate on 
existing cards reached 14.7%.”). 
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technically an intermediary would be violating the statutory requirement that 
an issuer not receive any funds unless the issuer’s target amount is met.196 
E. The Challenges Surrounding Material Changes 
If a material change to an offering’s terms or other information occurs, the 
SEC proposed requiring “the intermediary to give or send to any potential 
investors who have made investment commitments notice of the material 
change, stating that the investor’s investment commitment will be cancelled 
unless the investor reconfirms his or her commitment within five business days 
of receipt of the notice.”197 If the investor fails to recommit, the proposed rules 
also require sending a notice to the investor of the cancellation and return of 
funds.198 The proposed rules say nothing, however, about sending additional 
reminders to an investor who does not recommit. Given the tendency of inertia, 
a prudent intermediary might also include an additional warning message (if 
not multiple additional reminders) on the last of the five business day window 
to make sure that an investor is aware of what is about to happen, i.e., that their 
investment is about to be rescinded for failure to recommit. 
This proposed requirement to recommit is significant.199 It is enough of a 
hassle to have friends and other investors commit to invest the first time, and 
many will do this and likely forget to check back. Now all of sudden they need 
to recommit. If they do not check email regularly, this could be especially 
surprising.200 Too many surprised investors could cause significant sums of 
committed funds to be canceled. Seeing this, a discouraged issuer might think 
that their material changes angered their investors. More likely than not, 
investors simply did not realize the need to recommit. This is also a problem 
for investors who are more active in following their investment. When they see 
that there have been significant cancellations, they might deduce that the 
wisdom of the crowd is telling them that this investment is no longer a good 
idea, and, if they are more than 48 hours out from the closing, they might also 
cancel. 
 
 196. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), § 4A(a)(7), 126 Stat. 306, 316 (2012) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(7)). 
 197. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,476–77 (referencing proposed Rule 304(c)(1) of 
Regulation Crowdfunding (§ 227.304(c)(1))). 
 198. Id. at 66,477. 
 199. See Wefunder Letter 2, supra note 14 (“Given the ambiguity of what is ‘material’, we 
expect startups to be conservative, and nearly always toggle material changes requiring a re-
confirmation.”). 
 200. See id. (“From our current experience with 506(c) offerings, we believe a large segment 
of investors would prefer not to have to re-confirm their investment. In the past, we’ve had 
investors upset when they missed a deadline and had their investment cancelled. They assumed 
they are confirmed investors when funds hit escrow, and they are not happy to find out otherwise, 
if they were too busy to read their emails on a timely basis.”). 
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This hypothetical stresses the importance of ensuring an offering statement 
is right the first time201 so as to minimize material changes202 that require 
investors to recommit. Second, it puts into high relief the necessity that 
ambitious intermediaries establish multiple means of communication with 
investors. Perhaps intermediaries should also seek social media accounts and 
cell phone numbers so that they could send out Facebook messages or 
messages to LinkedIn accounts and also text messages reminding investors to 
recommit. Again, as previously discussed, the intermediary is the vital 
communication link between issuers and investors. If an intermediary does not 
develop additional ways to make sure that investors recommit, an issuer has 
little means of doing so on its own. 
F. Payments to Third Parties 
The proposed rules would not allow an intermediary to compensate 
someone for providing the intermediary with the personally identifiable 
information of any investor or potential investor.203 An intermediary, however, 
would be allowed “to compensate a person for directing issuers or potential 
investors to the intermediary’s platform” so long as two requirements are 
met.204 First, “the person does not provide the intermediary with the personally 
identifiable information of any potential investor.”205 Second, “the 
compensation, unless it is paid to a registered broker or dealer, is not based, 
directly or indirectly, on the purchase or sale of a security offered in reliance 
 
 201. See CrowdCast, Crowdfund Update with Sara Hanks of CrowdCheck, YOUTUBE (Dec. 
19, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QCWO9lXaZ_4 (starting around 4:40:00) (though 
talking in the context of Rule 506(c) of Regulation D, stressing how important it is to “have all 
your ducks in a row” when seeking funds in the online world as opposed to the offline world 
where investors are more forgiving). 
 202. See Juetten, Schoffler, Bowles & Wales CFIRA Letter, supra note 165, at 2 (“It is 
important to recognize that all businesses evolve during the development life cycle and require 
necessary pivot points in the operating model, product development, staffing, etc. . . . Requiring 
the issuers to update . . . could result in confusion to investors and an unnecessary time burden on 
issuers.”); see also Hanks CrowdCheck Letter, supra note 165, at 2 (“Online, disclosure will 
likewise evolve in response to investor questions, and it is important that this process, reflecting 
the ‘wisdom of the crowd,’ . . . be encouraged. Material disclosure may be elicited from the 
questions of the crowd, and issuer responses to crowd questioning may result in frequent updates 
to the disclosure presented.”); see also Wefunder Letter 2, supra note 14 (“The world of startups 
is by nature ambiguous and chaotic—problems occur every single day. Some of these problems 
are solvable with time and effort—it’s not always immediately clear what is a permanent material 
change, and what can be fixed with a little time.”). 
 203. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,477 (referencing proposed Rule 305(a) of Regulation 
Crowdfunding (§ 227.305(a))). 
 204. Id. at 66,478 (referencing proposed Rule 305(b) of Regulation Crowdfunding (§ 
227.305(b))). 
 205. Id. (referencing proposed Rule 305(b) of Regulation Crowdfunding (§ 227.305(b))). 
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on Section 4(a)(6) on or through the intermediary’s platform.”206 The SEC 
stated that it did “not believe Congress intended to disrupt current practices, 
such as paying for advertising based on Internet search rankings,” and so it 
clarified that “an intermediary [could] make payments to advertise its 
existence, provided that in doing so, it [did] not pay for the personally 
identifiable information of investors or potential investors.”207 
An ambitious intermediary is grateful to hear the SEC proposed this 
approach of not disrupting current practices.208 Many crowdfunding portals 
frequently promote top trending campaigns,209 and also compensate sites such 
as Twitter and Facebook for placing such promotions on their platforms.210 
When Twitter and Facebook users express an interest in a crowdfunding 
promotion and consent accordingly, those platforms will provide the interested 
user’s information to the crowdfunding portal and receive compensation.211 
This is an important aspect of current practices. An ambitious intermediary 
would be wise to use this flexibility to follow the example of RocketHub, 
which is engaged in numerous partnerships with well-known academic 
institutions, non-profit organizations, creative organizations, and large 
corporations, and these relationships generally leverage the partner’s pre-
existing user base or community to drive traffic to the crowdfunding portal.212 
 
 206. Id. (referencing proposed Rule 305(b) of Regulation Crowdfunding (§ 227.305(b))). 
 207. Id. (referencing proposed Rule 402 of Regulation Crowdfunding (§ 227.402)). 
 208. Imagine what would happen if the regulations substantially upset standard internet 
marketing practices—it would have the potential to undermine the valuation of many internet 
companies. A clear example would be Facebook, whose value is largely derived from its 
marketing abilities. Shayndi Raice, Anupreeta Das & John Letzing, Facebook Targets $96 Billion 
Value, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230474660457 
7382210530114498.html. In 2011, eighty-five percent of Facebook’s total revenue was accounted 
for by its ad business. Id.; see also Nicole E. Hong, If You Look Good on Twitter, VCs May Take 
Notice, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324 
659404578499702279196058 (“A growing group of venture capitalists are taking social media 
into consideration before they decide to pour millions of dollars into a startup. They’re checking 
how many online followers a company has, and how fast the numbers are growing.”). 
 209. Wefunder Letter 2, supra note 14 (“Paid advertising and referral programs are standard 
practice and integral to any well functioning web platform.”). Wefunder recommends that 
algorithmic preferencing of campaigns should be used by intermediaries. Wefunder Letter 1, 
supra note 87 (“If the methodology is clearly disclosed to investors, it should be permissible for a 
Funding Portal to sort offerings with an algorithmic score that takes into account any objective, 
numeric data that is reasonably likely to provide meaningful and non-misleading information to 
potential investors, such as numeric ratings by accredited and unaccredited users on the platform, 
number of commitments from investors (weighted by valuation of their portfolios), and page 
views.”). 
 210. ROCKETHUB WHITEPAPER, supra note 146, at 9. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. In response to the proposed rules, RocketHub elaborates: 
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G. Making Liquidity as Accessible as Possible for Investors 
Most investors do not want securities or equity for their own sake but for 
the ability to cash out.213 A significant problem with investing in startups and 
small businesses is the issue of illiquidity. In fact, Section 4A(a)(4)(C)(ii) 
requires an intermediary to ensure that a potential investor understands the 
illiquidity risk.214 The issue becomes how companies that are initially 
crowdfunded are prepared for the secondary market, which is where liquidity 
is most likely to be attained.215 While the issue is complicated, the 
intermediaries are the ideal place to facilitate liquidity. 
Though “[f]acilitating crowdfunded transactions alone would not require 
an intermediary to register as an exchange or as an alternative trading system 
(i.e., registration as a broker-dealer subject to Regulation ATS),”216 an 
intermediary would be more attractive to investors seeking liquidity if it did 
register as an exchange or alternative trading system and was able to facilitate 
the secondary market for the securities it was crowdfunding. Again, most 
investors ultimately want liquidity, which is most likely obtained in the 
secondary market. 
At the very least, an intermediary could seek to facilitate liquidity for its 
investors by providing a mechanism for certain limited transfers.217 The SEC 
notes that “provisions that allow investors to transfer the securities within one 
 
There is a clear distinction between an issuer hiring an individual or entity for promotion 
and more standard web-based advertising, such as Google ads, Facebook ads, or 
sponsored tweats [sic]. When an issuer hires an individual or entity for promotion, 
investors may not be aware of the commercial relationship between the parties. The 
Commission should not enact rules that may interfere with promotional compensation, but 
should rather require simple disclosure of a commercial relationship where it would not 
otherwise be apparent to investors. 
ROCKETHUB WHITEPAPER 3.0, supra note 13, at 6–7. 
 213. Wefunder Letter 2, supra note 14 (“[W]e have had the chance to speak with hundreds of 
first time investors, many of whom have never before invested in a private placement,” and 
“[o]ne of the primary concerns we hear from these new investors is the fact that they may not be 
able to gain liquidity for upwards of 7 years or longer.”). 
 214. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), § 4A(a)(4)(C)(ii), 126 Stat. 306, 316 (2012) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(4)(C)(ii)). 
 215. Per the statutory restriction, funding portals are not able to facilitate the secondary 
market because “a funding portal, by definition, is limited to acting as an intermediary in 
transactions involving the offer or sale of securities for the account of others solely pursuant to 
Section 4(a)(6), which are primary issuances of securities.” Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 
66,459 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (internal citation omitted); see also supra note 157. 
 216. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,459. 
 217. See ROCKETHUB WHITEPAPER 3.0, supra note 13, at 59–60 (“The proposed rules should 
not bar Portals from assigning and/or transferring securities . . . . Since the Portals hold a record 
of securities owned by various investors, on request the Portals are able to print and provide paper 
certificates. This will allow Portals to enforce transfer restriction by physically printing 
requirements on certificates.”) 
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year of issuance by reselling the securities to accredited investors, back to the 
issuer or in a registered offering or transferring them to certain family 
members or trusts of those family members” should mitigate some illiquidity 
costs.218 
In the interest of liquidity, perhaps intermediaries would be wise to 
simplify things and declare that there is heavily diluted or no voting power 
associated with Section 4(a)(6) securities.219 This recommendation is 
strengthened by pondering the nature of who will likely use Title III 
crowdfunding—those who have no other options.220 Maurice Lopes, a co-
founder of the crowdfunding platform EarlyShares, admonished that “many of 
the top angels, VCs [Venture Capitalists], lawyers, and pundits in the industry 
[stated] that ‘direct, equity-based, common stock crowd funding as envisioned 
by the JOBS Act would absolutely, positively preclude future investment by 
any serious professional investor, either angel or VC.”221 In other words, a 
 
 218. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,526. 
 219. Intermediaries should adopt the crowdfunding website WeFunder’s policy. Recognizing 
that “[v]enture capitalists are uncomfortable when startups have many small investors,” 
WeFunder created a WeFund, which: 
[I]s a series of an LLC that exists for the sole purpose of investing in one specific startup. 
All the investors pool their capital in the WeFund, which then invests as one entity in the 
startup. The startup only has one direct investor: the WeFund. If you invest through a 
WeFund, you will hold an interest in the fund instead of holding the company’s securities 
directly. 
Common Questions, WEFUNDER, https://wefunder.com/faq/common_questions (last visited Mar. 
15, 2014). “WeFunds are managed by our fully-owned affiliate, Wefunder Advisors, an 
investment advisor,” and “[a]ll voting and information rights are proxied to . . . Wefunder 
Advisors.” Id. In other words, for the sake of liquidity, likely provided by future financing (if 
provided at all), investors effectively give up their voting rights. Wefunder’s impressive results 
are compelling: “Startups seed funded on Wefunder have since raised over $20 million in venture 
capital.” Wefunder Letter 1, supra note 87. But see Miller & White CFIRA Letter , supra note 78, 
at 2 (“If the intent of the JOBS Act is to democratize the ability of individuals to invest in and 
share in the creation and growth of new and small businesses, we do not see the purpose in 
creating some kind of entity that would purport to ‘represent’ investors . . . . We do not believe in 
the creation of some kind of paternalistic nominee to ‘represent’ shareholders; rather we believe 
that that would be a step away from the democratization of the capital markets.”). 
 220. Rani Doyle, Jeffrey A. Baumel, Margaret H. Kavalaris & Walter Van Dorn, Dentons, 
United States: SEC Proposals For Securities Crowdfunding Under Title III Of The JOBS Act, 
MONDAQ (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/288874/Securities/SEC+Pro 
posals+For+Securities+Crowdfunding+Under+Title+III+Of+The+JOBS+Act (“Nevertheless, the 
smallest, earliest stage companies may focus on the potential of securities-based crowdfunding 
transactions where friends and family or banks cannot provide needed financing.”); see also 
Wefunder Letter 1, supra note 87 (filing their comments on the proposed rules to avoid the 
“worst outcome” that “only companies who are rejected by professional investors—and have no 
other option—will raise funds from the crowd”). 
 221. Letter from Maurice Lopes, Chief Exec. Officer, EarlyShares.com, Inc., to Marcia E. 
Asquith, Senior Vice President & Corp. Sec’y, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. 
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crowd of investors with voting power in securities crowdfunding emits a 
warning signal and professional investors who might otherwise have bought 
into a crowdfunded company (and thereby provided at least some crowd 
investors with liquidity) steer away from such investments. 
That same EarlyShares letter provided a good solution: an investor 
syndicate.222 After crowdfunding, all crowdfunding investors would be 
rounded into a single vehicle with a professional manager.223 The letter 
explained that the concept is not new to the crowdfunding industry—it is 
already in use in the Netherlands.224 There, Symbid, a major equity-based 
crowdfunding platform, organizes the investors of a successful crowdfunding 
investment round into a single purpose vehicle (which it calls an “Investor 
Cooperative”).225 The investor syndicate will be heard as a group and stand 
behind one powerful vote representing the entire amount of the equity offered 
in the fundraising campaign; in other words, the whole investor syndicate gets 
one vote.226 This ensures that the investors’ voices are heard, but it also keeps 
the business attractive to future rounds of financing, which is the key to 
investors’ ultimate goal of liquidity.227 While the idea of a syndicate seems 
relatively straightforward, this is a complicated area of financing. The idea will 
require serious deliberation by an intermediary as to how it might implement 
such a mechanism; once seasoned veterans of venture capital and their lawyers 
 
(Aug. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Earlyshares Letter to FINRA], available at http://www.finra.org/ 
web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/noticecomments/p153478.pdf, (quoting 
David S. Rose, Crowdfunding: How Do Venture Capitalists Feel About Following a 
Crowdfunding Capital Raise?, QUORA, http://www.quora.com/Crowdfunding/How-do-venture-
capitalists-feel-about-following-a-crowdfunding-capital-raise). Some would like to see a 
“crowdfunding fairness opinion” in order to make securities crowdfunded ventures more 
attractive to venture capital firms and strategic investors. See Letter from HamiltonClark Sec. Co, 
to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc., at 1 (July 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/noticecomments/p1473
22.pdf. 
 222. Earlyshares Letter to FINRA, supra note 221. After the recent lifting of the ban on 
general solicitation under Rule 506(c) of Regulation D, angels’ use of investor syndicates is 
gaining momentum. See Spencer E. Ante & Evelyn M. Rusli, New Rules Break Down the Walls 
for New Angel Investors, WALL ST. J., Oct 9. 2013, at B1. In their comments on the proposed 
rules, Wefunder is calling for a “special purpose vehicle” (SPV), which is akin to the Wefund 
discussed supra note 219, because “[n]o startup can take the risk of endangering their follow-on 
financing.” Wefunder Letter 1, supra note 87. This SPV would “group[] an unlimited number of 
investors into one fund, sponsored by the intermediary, and that may invest as a single 
shareholder into the issuer.” Id. 
 223. EarlyShares Letter to FINRA, supra note 221. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id.; see also The Symbid-model, SYMBID, http://www.symbid.com/pages/model (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 226. EarlyShares Letter to FINRA, supra note 221. 
 227. Id. 
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are brought into the equation, unsophisticated investors stand at a significant 
disadvantage.228 
The SEC recognizes that improving the liquidity of crowdfunded securities 
“could increase investor participation in securities-based crowdfunding 
offerings.”229 Both intermediaries and issuers win if more investors participate, 
and investors will seek to invest in crowdfunded securities on platforms where 
they can exit as easily as the statute allows. A prudent intermediary would 
either register as an exchange or alternative trading system, or, at the very 
least, have a mechanism in place to allow for the limited transfers discussed. 
Also, a prudent intermediary should consider heavily diluting or doing away 
with voting rights of Section 4(a)(6) securities through an investor syndicate or 
its equivalent. A crowd with voting rights is a red flag to serious investors 
contemplating providing follow-on financing for a startup; also, most 
unsophisticated retail investors would likely prefer liquidity over having voting 
rights. Easier access to liquidity in such an illiquid market as early-stage 
financing will attract investors. There is nothing more attractive to an 
entrepreneur seeking capital than a platform replete with investors. 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout the proposed rules, the SEC touted the flexibility that it was 
allowing intermediaries as it proposed rules for the underlying statutory 
framework of the CROWDFUND Act. Intermediaries should not take this 
flexibility for granted. This flexibility respects the expertise of intermediaries, 
and it allows them to develop optimal methods to make securities 
crowdfunding under Title III of the JOBS Act a success. By analyzing the 
proposed rules, ambitious intermediaries can lay bare the underlying policies 
and challenges of crowdfunding, which will persist regardless of the content of 
the final rules, and intermediaries can extract ways to address these challenges 
and policies. Ultimately, the intermediaries that succeed will be the ones who 
best understand and address these concerns; by so distinguishing themselves, 
these intermediaries will attract more issuers and investors. 
 
 228. See John S. (Jack) Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, 
Saverin, and Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 635 
(2013). Wroldsen argues that “crowdfunding statutes and regulations should seek to protect 
crowdfunding investors from the horizontal risks of sophisticated venture capitalists without 
unduly burdening the developing market of crowdfunding investment.” Id. Wroldsen points out 
“a potentially greater danger than fraud or failure: success” as he discusses the example of 
Eduardo Saverin, one of the original founders of Facebook, who learned the hard way that 
“venture capitalists and their lawyers have developed intricate strategies for protecting the value 
of their investments.” Id. In contrast, Wefunder argues that an SPV would allow intermediaries to 
look out for the rights of smaller, unsophisticated investors in follow-on financings by venture 
capitalists. Wefunder Letter 1, supra note 87. 
 229. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,526 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013). 
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If intermediaries simply treat this flexibility as a null obligation or as an 
excuse to only perform bare minimum compliance, however, they should not 
be surprised to have issuers or investors drag them into lawsuits over issuers’ 
and investors’ own compliance failures. Equally as undesirable, intermediaries 
could potentially see this flexibility regulated away in response to such 
lawsuits. Ambitious intermediaries will not let this happen. They will view 
“flexibility” as a challenge to prove to the SEC that, when given the flexibility, 
they can devise more effective systems than the SEC could have hoped to 
create by regulation. 
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